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RISKY MAIL: CONCERNS IN CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY–
CLIENT EMAIL
Rebecca Bolin

Early in the days of attorney–client email, David Hricik wrote a
soothing law review article, Lawyers Worry Too Much About
Transmitting Client Confidences By Internet E-mail, arguing that email
had risks but could be assumed private for the purpose of professional
ethics. The ABA agreed in 1999, issuing a formal opinion that
encrypting email was not required by ethical standards, and most
jurisdictions followed suit. The 1999 ABA opinion persists today,
despite being dangerously technology-specific, focused on almost
obsolete technology, and more than ten years later, resting on unsettled
legal foundation.
Attorneys should be concerned about the risks to confidentiality in
attorney–client email for three reasons: legal uncertainty about general
privacy expectations for email, broad waivers of email privacy through
provider policies, and unrelated disclosure by third parties. Casespecific issues have become critical to determine ethical duties in
confidential email: manifold local privacy laws, local ethical standards,
and provider policies.
Legal, authorized third-party access now poses a serious risk to
confidentiality in attorney–client email. At least one type of email,
employer-provided email, is no longer considered confidential in this
context, a known ethical hazard for attorneys. In the context of Fourth
Amendment law, email privacy remains unsettled, even after the
landmark Sixth Circuit decision in United States v. Warshak.
Attorneys and clients need to understand these risks before informed
consent is possible. Technology-based solutions may be part of broader
best practices to protect confidentiality. Attorneys and clients must
understand the technology at issue, rather than blindly risking clients’
confidences and attorneys’ ethical duties on obsolete reassurances and
technologies they do not understand.

 Resident Fellow, Yale Law School Information Society Project. J.D. Yale Law School, B.A.
Computational & Applied Mathematics, Rice University. Thanks to the entire Yale Law School
Information Society Project and Jack Balkin, Sidney Byrd, Robert Gordon, Margot Kaminski, Christina
Mulligan, Wendy Seltzer, and Lee Wilson for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Warning—This e-mail, including all attachments is not encrypted.
Accordingly, it is possible for others to read and use this confidential
information. We take no responsibility for using unencrypted e-mail and
this e-mail and related attachments may be deemed by the court to be a
waiver of attorney–client privilege and the work-product doctrine.1

This mocking warning is how a technologist sees lax email practice
of attorneys—self-serving boilerplate with no corresponding action.2
Attorneys have been lulled into false security, risking clients’ most
precious secrets. In 2009, more than 93% of attorneys used email to
communicate privileged or confidential information.3
At the dawn of attorney–client email, Professor David Hricik wrote a
calm, level-headed law review article, Lawyers Worry Too Much About
Transmitting Client Confidences By Internet E-Mail, published in 1998.4
1. Jack Seward, Failure to Encrypt E-Mail Jeopardizes the Privilege and Work-Product
Doctrine: Protect or Perish, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 44, 44 (2006) (“One thing we can perhaps all agree
on is that the following message is not going to be well-received by clients, and in all seriousness
professionals are not about to use it, but bankruptcy professionals may indeed need to read it more than
once.”).
2. Id.
3. Web and Communication Technology, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LEGAL
TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT 30 (2009).
4. David Hricik, Lawyers Worry Too Much About Transmitting Client Confidences by Internet
E-Mail, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459 (1998).
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Professor Hricik argued that email was not so dangerous, and could be
relied on like phone calls or faxes—imperfect but assumed private. The
corresponding ABA opinion, issued in 1999, agreed.5 Encryption was
too much worry over email.
In 2005, Professor Hricik brushed up that opinion, again writing that
email should be considered private.6 Since that time, local bar
associations have refined and struggled with this position, while
technology and law marched on. The ABA modified its position in
2011, requiring attorneys to counsel and warn clients about employer
emails and equipment. While an excellent step forward, this discussion
is still incomplete. Even today, academics, practitioners, and bar
associations rely on dated technology, outdated law, and incomplete
assessment of risks.
The ABA’s 20/20 Committee on Ethics
passedlong-awaited reforms in summer 2012, retreating from its now
obsolete 1999 position, and offering some guidance in an unresolved
ethical problem area.
After disjoint state and national bar opinions, email privacy remains
in a state of flux, balancing case-specific policies and security risks, far
from the ABA’s confident conclusions about broad email privacy back
in 1999. This shaky legal foundation is not stable enough for a client’s
weighty matters and an attorney’s ethical duties. Lawyers should
consider all of the potential hazards in email to their ethical obligations
and their clients’ confidences.
I am not concerned by malicious, illegal access in this context, or by
careless attorneys sending email to the wrong users or losing devices,
though surely both are problematic to an attorney’s ethical duties of
confidentiality.7 Careless misdirection and illegal, “hacker” invasion are
known hazards.8 I am primarily concerned about the gray fog
surrounding email’s particular confidentiality issues involving legal,
authorized access by third parties, as well as evolving expectations in
email privacy in legal and ethical standards.
5. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999).
6. See David Hricik & Amy Falkingham, Lawyers Still Worry Too Much About Transmitting EMail Over the Internet, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 265, 266 (2005).
7. Hricik, supra note 4, at 487–88 (“In contrast, inadvertent transmission on an OSP does effect
[sic] confidentiality, because the recipient most likely does not owe any duty whatsoever to the sender.
In this regard, however, the potential for misdirection of e-mail is no different than it is with a fax:
reasonable care can virtually eliminate any risk.”).
8. See generally, Roland L. Trope & Sarah Jane Hughes, Red Skies in the Morning—
Professional Ethics at the Dawn of Cloud Computing, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 111 (2011); Bill Piatt
& Paula DeWitte, Loose Lips Sink Attorney–client Ships: Unintended Technological Disclosure of
Confidential Communications, 39 ST. MARY’S L.J. 781 (2008); Ash Mayfield, Comment, Decrypting the
Code of Ethics: The Relationship Between an Attorney’s Ethical Duties and Network Security, 60 OKLA.
L. REV. 547 (2007); Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Ethical Risks from the Use of Technology, 31 RUTGERS
COMPUTER& TECH. L. J. 1 (2004).
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Since 1999, at least one major category of email, workplace
employer-provided email, is no longer considered private in this context.
Third-party access has now become a known ethical issue for attorneys
and clients, showing that expectations in email may now be casespecific inquiry, depending on the provider’s privacy policy. Attorneys
using third-party systems should no longer rely on the ABA’s
technology-specific assurance and should instead carefully consider the
policies of third-party email services. Attorneys now need to attempt to
differentiate individual third-party providers with generally privacyfocused policies, like Yahoo,9 from services with less robust privacy
protection.
In Part I of this Article, I explain the existing legal and technological
framework for decisions about email security. This Part describes
outdated understandings of technology, as well as the outdated statutes
currently covering email.
Part II discusses the major ethical rulings in this area, starting with
the ABA’s technology-specific 1999 ruling that email should be
assumed private. The updated view on email security in the more
thoughtful State Bar of California’s 2010 opinion shows that the 1999
technology-specific assumptions have become dangerous as technology
evolved but ethical standards did not. The ABA’s 2011 ethics opinion
about employee-provided email concedes that an entire category of
email is no longer private, despite the broad conclusion from 1999.
Finally, in summer 2012, the ABA released new model rules that retreat
from its 1999 position and require attorneys to educate themselves and
their clients about the risks of email. Taken as a whole, these opinions
and rules show a turning point: case-specific factors about email now
determine privacy expectations, not general, technology-specific
principles.
Part III explores enduring issues in email confidentiality. The
expectation of privacy in email in the context of the Fourth Amendment
remains unsettled, more than ten years later. The only federal appellate
case on the issue finds a Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy, but
not with respect to the Internet Service Provider (ISP) itself, and only
after investigating the provider’s policies. Privacy policies themselves
might contain broad waivers of privacy, which may surprise readers.
Finally, confidentiality is at risk when a third party makes an authorized
9. I use Yahoo as an example of a responsible service provider with extensive privacy policies,
based in part on its unpopular refusal to give the contents of an email account to the parents of a Marine
killed in Iraq. See Claudia Buck, Digital Assets Are Often Forgotten When People Die, BUFFALO
NEWS, Dec. 26. 2011, at C4. However, even in that case, Yahoo lost and was forced to violate its own
privacy policies. I also use as examples other generally privacy-focused email providers: “free”
providers such as Microsoft (Hotmail), Google (Gmail), or paid providers such as emails associated with
Internet accounts for users, such as Comcast.
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disclosure, such as responding to information freedom laws or civil
discovery.
Part IV considers technology-based solutions for sensitive data, both
as technical solutions and as markers of confidentiality. Ethics opinions
cannot endure with specific technology requirements. Instead, attorneys
need to be aware of technological risks in systems they use and weigh
risks with their clients to obtain meaningful consent.
A. Background
Clients tell attorneys their most private, secret information, and
attorneys have a solemn duty to protect clients’ confidences and keep
their secrets.10 Confidentiality is the bedrock principle of legal ethics,
and its duties are nearly absolute.11 Attorneys have an ethical and
practical duty to safeguard their client’s information, and failure to do so
may waive attorney–client privilege.
Confidentiality is an ethical duty for all attorneys. All states have a
codified version of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, requiring
attorneys to safeguard their clients’ confidential information.12
Confidentiality applies to “all information relating to the representation,
whatever its source.”13 Attorneys in all states have a duty to protect
both privileged and confidential information, even when using email.14
Rule 1.6(a) requires a lawyer to refrain from revealing “information
relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed
consent.”15 This requirement is closely related to Rule 1.1 requiring
“competent representation to a client,” which includes confidentiality.16
Comments to Rule 1.6 also require attorneys to take reasonable efforts
to safeguard the information from their own agents, and from
communicating confidential information to unintended recipients.17
These rules are not technology-specific, but instead show an attorney
must use his professional judgment about the medium of communication
and the risks to confidential information. The rules also allow attorneys
to rely on both law and contracts, including confidentiality agreements,
in this ethical duty. An attorney may not disclose confidential

10. See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3–9
(1998) (explaining confidentiality’s importance to lawyers and clients).
11. Id. at 1.
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009).
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2009).
14. Hricik, supra note 4, at 478.
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009).
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009).
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 16, 17 (2009).
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information, subject to very limited exceptions.18
Confidentiality is critical to protecting the privileged status of an
attorney’s communications with clients. Attorney–client privilege is
intended to encourage clients’ honest and full disclosure without fear.19
The traditional elements of attorney client privilege are: (1) where legal
advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relevant to that purpose, (4)
made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at this instance permanently
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8)
except when the client waives the privilege.20 Because privilege is an
obstruction to truth in a system generally designed to seek truth,
privilege is often strictly confined.21 The relevant element here, present
in all formulations of the elements, is confidentiality, and the risk of
waiver when communications are not confidential.22
Privilege protects communications which are “intended to remain
confidential,” and are made in such circumstances that they are
“reasonably expected and understood to be confidential.”23 Privilege
can be waived by types of third-party access. For example, a
communication might not be confidential if the parties made no effort to
prevent the communication from being overheard, or if the information
is intended to reach other parties.24 Attorneys may waive privilege by
sending information in a way that allows third parties to access it.25
Courts and jurisdictions can vary wildly in determining when
privilege is waived by third-party access, broadly using three different
strategies: a strict test under which disclosure causes waiver, a lenient
test which uses intent, or a middle-ground test, which most courts use.26
Courts can consider (1) reasonableness of precautions, (2) number of
inadvertent disclosures, (3) extent of disclosure, (4) measures to rectify

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See Fischel, supra note 10, at 1.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 US 383, 389 (1981).
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961).
Id. § 2291(4).
Other formulations of the traditional factors will also include confidentiality. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000) (“(1) a communication (2)
made between privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal
assistance for the client.”).
23. United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d. 641, 645 (5th Cir. 1981).
24. United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d. 714, 723 (9th Cir. 1984) (no privilege when statement made
in presence of several searching police officers); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1358
(4th Cir. 1984) (intended public prospectus).
25. Hricick considers this kind of waiver through sending email to the wrong parties. See Hricik
& Fallingham, supra note 6, at 268.
26. David B. Smallman, The Purloined Communications Exception to Inadvertent Waiver:
Internet Publication and Preservation of Attorney–Client Privilege, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 715, 723
(1997).
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the disclosure, (5) any delay in taking those measures, and (6)
overriding issues of fairness and justice.27 Courts have varied slightly
interpreting the requirements for confidentiality. Some follow a
subjective, “intent” requirement, while others refer to circumstances
“reasonably apparent.”28 Courts often inquire whether a reasonable
person would have expected the communication to reach third parties,
not the subjective state of mind of the communicator.
Expectation of privacy is related to, but not identical to,
confidentiality in the context of privileged communication;
communications may still be considered confidential even when they are
not private. A surreptitious eavesdropper, though compromising
privacy, may not compromise confidentiality, assuming the attorney and
client took reasonable steps to protect the communications.29
Sometimes, a known third-party’s presence will not waive privilege.
For example, an attorney speaking to a client through a translator is not
private, but would be considered confidential.30 An attorney speaking to
a client with another privileged party, such as a spouse, would also not
compromise privilege.31 Recorded jail communications can also be
privileged, despite the eavesdropper.32
Privilege law can allow attorneys and clients to use reasonable efforts
27. Id. at 723–24.
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 71, reporter’s note to cmt. b (2000)
(citing Esposito v. United States, 436 F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir.1970) (“reasonable person”); United States
v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441, 447 (2d Cir. 1958) (“understood”)); cf. Robert P. Mosteller & Kenneth S.
Broun, The Danger to Confidential Communications in the Mismatch Between the Fourth Amendment’s
“Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” and the Confidentiality of Evidentiary Privileges, 32 CAMPBELL
L. R. 147, 172–73 (2010).
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 71 cmt. c, illus. 1 (2000)
(“Client and Lawyer confer in Client’s office about a legal matter. Client realizes that occupants of
nearby offices can normally hear the sound of voices coming from Client’s office but reasonably
supposes they cannot intelligibly detect individual words. An occupant of an adjoining office secretly
records the conference between Client and Lawyer and is able to make out the contents of their
communications. Even if it violates no law in the jurisdiction, the secret recording ordinarily would not
be anticipated by persons wishing to confer in confidence. Accordingly, the fact that the eavesdropper
overheard the Client–Lawyer communications does not impair their confidential status.”).
30. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) (allowing confidentiality with
necessary third parties).
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 71 cmt. b (2000) (“[I]n a
jurisdiction that recognizes an absolute husband–wife privilege, the presence of a wife at an otherwise
confidential meeting between the husband and the husband’s lawyer does not destroy the confidentiality
required for the attorney–client privilege.”).
32. See United States v. Salyer, No. 10-0061, 2012 WL 507118 (D. Cal. 2012) (determining
privilege in calls made by a defendant in custody and recorded, based on content seeking legal advice);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 71 cmt. c, illus. 3 (2000) (“A jailer requires
Client, an incarcerated person, and Lawyer to confer only in a conference area that, as Client and
Lawyer know, is sometimes secretly subjected to recorded video surveillance by the jailer. If Client and
Lawyer take reasonable precautions to avoid being overheard, the fact that the jailer secretly records
their conversation does not deprive it of its confidential character.”).
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to create confidentiality in places where a reasonable expectation of
privacy can never exist. An attorney may, with reasonable measures,
speak confidentially to a client at a public restaurant, at a park bench, at
a jail, or in a courthouse hallway. All of these circumstances are outside
the protection of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable expectation of
privacy. 33 The role of the participants, the actions of the participants,
and the law of privilege allows the speakers to construct a temporary
space for confidentiality, using reasonable means to protect its
confidentiality. In such a space, the efforts of the parties are critical to
establish confidentiality.34
B. How Email Works
The bedrock for the ABA and state decisions about confidentiality in
encrypted email is Professor Hricik’s 1998 description of “Internet email,” then an emerging technology.35 This conceptual understanding,
before clouds and Wi-Fi and mobile broadband, fixes email as a
technology far from its modern embodiment. Though useful at the time,
these facts are incomplete today.
The Internet is a collection of hosts, such as home computers or
servers in a data center, connected to a network of routers, devices that
decide how to move information through the network.36 Routers can be
as simple as the home variety that often provide Wi-Fi wireless
networking, or as complex as the cabinet-sized core routers in major
Internet exchange points. For a host to send information to a particular
destination host, it must first split the information into short segments
called “packets.” The host directly connects to its local router and sends
each packet to the local router along with the intended destination.37
The router forwards the packet based on the destination to another
router it believes is closer to the destination. The process continues until
the packet reaches a router that is directly connected to the destination
host, which simply forwards it to the host. Any intermediate router will

33. See Mosteller & Broun, supra note 28, at 172–73.
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 71 cmt. c, illus. 2 (2000);
id. § 71, reporter’s note to cmt. c (based on Schwartz v. Wenger, 124 N.W.2d 489 (Minn.
1963) (allowing eavesdropper testimony because client and attorney made no effort to ensure secrecy in
courtroom hallway conversation)).
35. Hricik, supra note 4, at 461–65 (“E-mail programs send correspondence from one personal
account to any Internet machine . . . [s]ignificantly, for the reasons discussed below, when I log onto
AOL, my computer is connected directly over a phone line to AOL.”).
36. See ANDREW S. TANENBAUM & DAVID J. WETHERALL, COMPUTER NETWORKS 54 (5th ed.
2011) [hereinafter COMPUTER NETWORKS].
37. Id. at 355–63 ([“T]he network layer must know about the topology of the network (i.e. the
set of all routers and links) and choose appropriate paths through it, even for large networks.”).
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be able to read the contents of an unencrypted packet.38 The packets
contain a sequence number and other information that allows the
receiving host to reassemble the original, complete message.
This style of decentralized routing is called “packet-switched
networking” and allows the Internet to continue to operate even when
some of the links in the network fail, because packets will simply take a
different path.39 Neither the sender nor any router controls which full
path any packet takes over the network, and each packet may take a
completely different path even for the same message. This routing also
makes it impossible to predict the route of any particular message or any
packet with certainty. The decentralized network of the Internet differs
from a circuit-switched network, such as the historical telephone
network.40 In a circuit-switched network, the entire message will follow
the same path, and the connection will be dedicated that communication
for a finite period of time.41
In 1997, users believed that email traveled to a personal computer,
like a physical mailbox, where it stopped:42
Thus, if I send an e-mail message from my AOL e-mail address to my
Baker & Botts e-mail address, AOL merely sends the message through its
host onto the Internet. The e-mail is then routed over the Internet to
Baker & Botts’ host computer, where it is then routed by that computer to
my mailbox. I can then complete the transmission by logging onto my
Baker & Botts e-mail mailbox, providing my password for my Baker &
Botts mailbox, and downloading the message to the computer in my
office.43

When Professor Hricik wrote his article, this description was more or
less true. AOL, like most service providers, deleted mail off its servers
after a few days to save on then-expensive storage. In 1997, Professor
wrote of AOL’s e-mail deletion policy:
(i) The current default is about two (2) days after it is read. E-mail that is
38. See Hricik, supra note 4, at 466.
39. COMPUTER NETWORKS, supra note 36, at 162–64 (“With packet switching there is no fixed
path, so different packets can follow different paths, depending on the network conditions at the time
they are sent, and they may arrive out of order . . . . With packet switching, packets can be routed around
dead switches.”).
40. Id. at 9–12.
41. Id. at 161–2 (“[O]nce a [phone] call has been set up, a dedicated path between both ends
exists and will continue to exist until the call is finished. An important property of circuit switching is
the need to set up an end-to-end path before any data can be sent.”).
42. Daniel J. Pope & Helen Whatley Pope, “Is It Safe . . . .”, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 138, 141 (1997)
(“Unlike web pages, e-mail addresses are accessible only by the mailbox owners and by those
responsible for maintaining the computer system in which the mailbox resides. Anyone can send to an
e-mail address, but only its owner, or one with the password to the mailbox, can access what has been
sent. In this way, e-mailboxes are similar to post office boxes—without the key, you can’t get in.”).
43. Hricik, supra note 4, at 465.
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sent but not read is permanently deleted from the system after about
twenty-five to thirty (25–30) days. (Consequently, to keep copies of any
communications, you should store them on your personal computer hard
drive or in print form.).44

Today, AOL’s terms of service are silent on the deletion issue,
suggesting it could keep a copy of everything coming in or out of an
email account forever.
When Professor Hricik accessed his AOL mail in 1998, he used a
program running on his computer called a mail client. Well-known,
stand-alone mail clients are common today as well, such as Microsoft
Outlook. These programs allow the user to store a copy of the mail on
the user’s own device, and the mail client accesses the mail from the
device’s storage, transferring incoming and outgoing mail to the server.
Today, many companies use these clients with their own internal servers
that perform mail exchange in an internal network. Today, there is no
one “Baker & Botts’ host computer”; there are multiple in an internal
network which many attorneys can access from many locations, through
internal networks as well as the Internet through secured connections.
Another common method of accessing mail is using an email client
within a webpage. This type of access to email through an Internet site
is called “webmail.” Corporate off-site mail and services like Gmail or
Yahoo use this type of access. For these services, data is accessed,
stored, and sent to off-site computing and storage facilities, commonly
called “the cloud.”45 The operator of the cloud would, technically
speaking, be able to view any unencrypted message stored in its servers.
The data may also be stored temporarily in storage such as a browser
cache when accessed by a user.
Today, cloud computing is common for many Internet users, not just
mysterious system administrators. Users routinely store data in clouds,
from photos to emails to online gaming profiles.46 Sophisticated

44. Id. at 488–89.
45. Paul Lanois, Privacy in the Age of the Cloud, 15 J. INTERNET L. 3, 3 (2011); COMPUTER
NETWORKS, supra note 36, at 672–73 (“Nowadays, much of the excitement around the Web is using it
for applications and services. Examples include buying products on e-commerce sites, searching library
catalogs, exploring maps, reading and sending email, and collaborating on documents. These uses are
like traditional application software (e.g. mail readers and word processors). The twist is that these
applications run inside the browser, with user data stored on servers in Internet data centers. They use
Web protocols to access information via the Internet, and the browser to display a user interface. The
advantage of this approach is that users do not need to install separate application programs, and user
data can be accessed from different computers and backed up from the service operator. It is proving so
successful it that it is rivaling traditional application software. Of course, the fact that these applications
are offered for free by large service providers helps. This model is the prevalent form of cloud
computing, in which computing moves off individual desktop computers and into shared clusters of
servers in the Internet.”) (emphasis omitted).
46. Lanois, supra note 45, at 3–4.
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corporations store their data using expensive, complex networks with
the highest security; 45%of multi-national companies were using some
form of cloud computing in 2011.47 Of course, cloud computing has its
own risks and ethics issues, yet to be decided, especially if maintained
by a third party.48 It also has security and privacy only as good as the
provider allows. At a minimum, cloud-based solutions risk the problem
of inconsistent jurisdictional rules on privacy and inconsistent crossnational standards.49
Users can access webmail services for email using many kinds of
web-based applications, mail applications, and smartphone applications.
For example, a user can access Google’s Gmail through any major
browser, as well as through specially designed Gmail mobile programs
or through iPhone’s mail application configured for that account. Often,
users access the data using only the cloud, storing nothing on their own
computers. Others still use Professor Hricik’s model and download data
to their computers after deleting the server copy, leaving an archival
copy or perhaps no copy at all for the mail provider. It is possible to use
a webmail service exactly as Professor Hricik described in 1998, or to
access data only through webmail, or to store copies on both a computer
and on the cloud.
Professor Hricik believed email could not be searched or even stored
by a service provider.50 Because mail was so quickly deleted at that
time, no copy persisted to search.51 Today, email may be stored longterm in the cloud, which is easy to search and often must be searched. It
may even exist without a user’s knowledge as an archival or back-up
47. Id. at 3.
48. See generally Nicole Black, CLOUD COMPUTING FOR LAWYERS 26 (2012) (published by the
ABA). The ABA’s 20/20 Commission issued a paper for comment in 2010 which included issues about
cloud computing, but has not yet addressed those issues in formal recommendations. See Letter from
ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 Working Grp. on the Implications of New Techs., to ABA Entities,
Courts, Bar Ass’n (state, local, specialty and int’l), Law Schs, Individuals, and Entities (Sept. 20, 2010)
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20/wor
k_product.html.
49. See Lanois, supra note 45, at 10. Though not strictly “email,” message delivery within a
cloud is how many secure environments, such as banks or medical providers, correspond with users.
Readers may be familiar with a generic email from a secure provider notifying users to log in to their
account to read their message, perhaps for a banking alert or a medical bill. For example, a bank might
notify a user of a bill or transaction by email or text message. However, the message will direct the user
to the bank’s secure web portal to view details. Thus, the provider secures the message by the user’s
authentication and access methods. Many law firms or corporate clients already have similar mailboxes
to store secure messages.
50. Hricik, supra note 4, at 472–73 (“As with the [Web], a third-party with access to a law firm’s
database could, for example, search by client’s name, or a specific topic, and locate such documents.
The same is true for information on the [Web], but it is not true for Internet e-mail.”).
51. See generally id. at 473 (“[T]he concerns present when a law firm gives access of its
database to a third party are not in any way reasonably analogous to transmitting Internet e-mail.”).
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copy. Providers regularly search e-mail to monitor spam, to monitor
employees’ personal use, to provide targeted advertising, or to enforce
terms of service. When Professor Hricik sends a message to his Baker
& Botts account from AOL today, both providers likely keep multiple
copies on multiple servers. They may even store archival snapshots of
the servers for back-up purposes, in multiple locations, which may be in
neither Baker Botts’ Texas headquarters nor AOL’s Virginia
headquarters. The copies may not even be stored in the United States.
The common persistence of that data, unlikely in the 1990s, may
leave a complete record. Justice Brandeis observed in dissent for a case
in a wiretapping precedent to Katz, “[w]ays may some day be developed
by which the government, without removing papers from secret drawers,
can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose
to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.”52 Today, those
secret drawers are servers with years of archived emails. Complete
copies of emails may be commonly kept at both the sending and
receiving end.
Professor Hricik and the ABA categorized email into four categories:
direct e-mail, private system e-mail, “on-line service,” and “Internet email.”53 The first category, direct email, is considered an email sent
from one modem to another, or “[t]he modem simply converts the
content of the e-mail into digital information that is carried on landbased phone lines to the recipient’s modem.”54 “This is virtually
indistinguishable from . . . sending a fax.”55 In 2005, Professor Hricik
suggested this was possible using two dial-up connections and that the
direct phone line would protect the communication.56 Today, such a
connection for email is unlikely outside a private network.
The second category, “private system email,” persists today as the
most secure.57 In 1998, Professor Hricik described a local network
using local proprietary connections called a Local Area Network (LAN),
as opposed to the Internet at large. This secure network is how most
offices operate today.58 Professor Hricik also describes offsite access

52. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
53. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 6–7 (1999); Hricik,
supra note 4, at 485–92 (titling the categories with slight modification).
54. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 6 (1999).
55. Id.
56. See Hricik & Fallingham, supra note 6, at 272.
57. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 6–7 (1999).
58. COMPUTER NETWORKS, supra note 36, at 19–23 (“LANs are widely used to connect personal
computers and consumer electronics to let them share resources (e.g. printers) and exchange
information. When LANs are used by companies, they are called enterprise networks. Wireless LANs
are very popular these days, especially in homes, older office buildings, cafeterias, and other places
where it is too much trouble to install cables.”) (emphasis omitted).
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when a “lawyer’s network dials that client’s network directly over landbased phone lines and transmits the message.”59 Professor Hricik
claimed that this communication never used “external phone lines” to
access the private network.60
In 2005, Professor Hricik presented a more modern version of
accessing private networks through Virtual Private Networks (VPN) and
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL).61 Both VPN and SSL require certificates
that provide a secure “tunnel” through the Internet using encryption and
authentication requirements.62
Packets that are intercepted by
intermediate routers are unintelligible. Both SSL and VPN applications
may use “external phone lines” and the Internet at large, but can secure
data in the transit network using additional security measures, always
including encryption, and typically requiring authentication of one or
both end points.
Readers today are likely quite familiar with SSL technology,
commonly used by “secure” websites like banks. Readers are likely
familiar with a cartoon lock on their browser indicating a connection
like SSL, or newer protocols today, such as TLS. Readers may also be
familiar with VPN, which requires special software to allow a user to
remotely log on to a secure network. Many firms and companies use
this kind of software and even more security, such as dynamic
passwords on key chains. Today, private networks and remote access
are commonly used to communicate and secure email.
The third email category, “on-line service providers,” is shorthand for
an email address provided by an Internet Service Provider.63 In the
1990s, this email was furnished as part of a paid service to access the
Internet; thus, AOL was both the mail provider and the ISP.64 This
same identity persisted over AOL’s other private services, identifying
the user based on a screen name.65 At that time, Professor Hricik would
have used a dial-up connection to connect to AOL’s proprietary
network, or “online” service, and he may have then connected the
Internet through AOL. Messages sent directly to AOL could use the
dial-up connection to AOL’s “online” services, not the Internet.
Professor Hricik relied on AOL policies and the law at the time to
suggest that an attorney could rely on this service to send a message to

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Hricik, supra note 4, at 486.
Id.
Hricik & Fallingham, supra note 6, at 279–80.
COMPUTER NETWORKS, supra note 36, at 26, 853–55 (explaining VPN and SSL).
Hricik, supra note 4, at 487–88.
Id. at 464–65.
See id.
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an “online” client who used the same service.66 Note in that case, the
attorney’s dial-up connection and e-mail would be provided by AOL, as
would the client’s. Today, a user can still have an e-mail assigned by
their service provider, such as Comcast, but distinct mail providers are
more common, such as Google or Hotmail, and such communication
would generally include the Internet. Today, this situation is unlikely
outside a private network.
The fourth type, “Internet E-Mail,” is e-mail communicated by an
Internet provider but using a separate mail service.67 Today, we would
consider this most mail outside a private network. Today, users
commonly use a third-party Internet service provider, such as Comcast,
to communicate mail from another mail service, such as Gmail.
In 1998, Professor Hricik relied heavily on “land-based phone lines,”
where he believed messages moved.68 Lawyers in the days of dial-up
could connect directly through phone lines,69 as Professor Hricik
remembered in 2005.70 Today, outside of a private network, email goes
through multiple servers and routers, and is sent over fiber-optic cabling
with mixed purpose, including television, phone, and Internet data.71
Professor Hricik always knew the first stop on his email’s journey,
the initial router that was installed at AOL and dialed into by his home
modem, or by Baker & Botts at his office. Today, Professor Hricik
could send the same emails using Wi-Fi, or he could use his phone,
tablet, or computer on mobile broadband.72
Using any of these services, he could access his email from the mail
provider’s cloud, using a web client to access a cloud instead of a mail
client. These messages may or may not use wireless services, and they
would then use modern fiber-optic cables and innumerable networking
equipment like routers and switches along the way in unknown

66. Id. at 492.
67. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 8–9 (1999).
68. See also id. at 9 (“[Because] Internet e-mail typically travels through land-based phone lines,
the only points of unique vulnerability consist of the third party-owned Internet services providers or
‘ISPs.’”).
69. Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam, The Internet: New Dangers of Ethics Traps, 56 OR. ST.
B. BULL. 17 (1995) (“If a lawyer’s computer and a client’s computer communicate directly over the
phone lines and not through a third-party computer, the fact that the lawyer and the client are
communicating in bits and bytes rather than by voice should not affect the availability of attorney–client
privilege.”); David Hricik, Confidentiality and Privilege in High-Tech Communications, 60 TEX. B. J.
104, 110 (1997).
70. Hricik & Fallingham, supra note 6, at 272 (“E-mail can also be sent directly over land-based
phone lines, from one computer to another. When e-mail is sent this way, it is no different than sending
a fax.”).
71. Id. at 277.
72. See COMPUTER NETWORKS, supra note 36, at 65–69 (Third Generation Mobile Phone
Networks), 70–73 (Wireless LANs: 802.11).
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jurisdictions.
C. Privacy Statutes for Email: ECPA
To understand email privacy requires discussing the dated federal
privacy laws and their exceptions to determine these rights. Two types
of laws can apply to email: those targeted at real-time interceptions,
such as wiretapping, and those intended for access of communications in
storage at a later date.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) was enacted in
1986 to amend Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, which prevented wiretapping.73 ECPA was intended to
protect privacy in new communication mediums and had wide support.74
ECPA has not been amended since, despite growing criticism, in the
context of email and many other applications.75 The 1986 amendments
had two chapters relevant here: the Wiretap Act and the Stored
Communications Act (SCA).
The Wiretap Act establishes criminal and civil liability for “any
person who . . . intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire,
oral, or electronic communication” as well as for any use, disclosure, or
attempted use of such interceptions.76 This was intended to protect “the
privacy of electronic communications by prohibiting their unlawful
interception while travelling to the recipient.”77 Like previous wiretap
provisions, ECPA states that intercepted messages do not lose their
privileged character because of its statutory authority.78 ECPA in itself
has no authority regarding privilege.
The Wiretap Act exempts interceptions “where one of the parties to
the communication has given prior consent to such interception” and
disclosure by a service provider “with the lawful consent of the
originator or any addressee or intended recipient.”79 ECPA also
exempts communications services providers if they use intercepts “in
the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity
which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the
73. Yvette Joy Liebesman, The Potential Effects of United States v. Councilman on the
Confidentiality of Attorney–client E-Mail Communications, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 893, 899 (2005).
74. See id. at 902–03.
75. See Miguel Helft & Claire Cain Miller, News Analysis: 1986 Privacy Law is Outrun by the
Web,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
9,
2011,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/technology/10privacy.html?pagewanted=all.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2006).
77. Liebesman, supra note 73, at 900.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (2006).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d); 2511(3)(b)(ii) (2006).
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protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service.”80
The Stored Communications Act covers messages in storage. SCA
established liability for a person who “intentionally accesses without
authorization a facility through which an electronic communication
service is provided” or “intentionally exceeds an authorization to access
that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to
a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage.”81
Service providers have an exemption from the Stored
Communications Act to access stored communications.82 However, it is
a crime for ISPs to disclose stored communications, generally
speaking,83 subject to several exceptions similar to the Wiretap Act,
including “as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service
or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that
service.”84 Service providers can also disclose communications with
consent “of the originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such
communication, or the subscriber in the case of the remote computer
service.”85 Government entities, such as law enforcement, have abilities
to compel disclosure within ECPA, discussed later, which are not
enjoyed by private entities, such as service providers.86
II. ETHICS OPINIONS REGARDING EMAIL
In the late 1990s, attorneys became concerned about the thenemerging technology of email, and local bar associations responded.
The South Carolina Bar issued the earliest opinion about email
encryption in 1995, which prohibited e-mail as insecure and required a
client’s approval.87 However, a second 1997 opinion required only
expectation of privacy and allowed email if encryption was discussed
between the client and lawyer. “A lawyer should discuss with a client
such options as encryption in order to safeguard against even inadvertent
disclosure of sensitive or privileged information when using e-mail.”88
Other local bar associations found encryption unnecessary in the late
1990s: Alaska, District of Columbia, Illinois, Kentucky, New York City,
New York State, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2006).
Liebesman, supra note 73, at 901; 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 2701(c) (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5) (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006).
South Carolina Bar Advisory Op. No. 94-27 (1995).
South Carolina Bar Advisory Op. No. 97-08 (1997).
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Vermont, though often with a requirement to inform clients.89 Some bar
associations required more caution, in the form of specific types of
consent or technological protections.90
In the 1990s, courts encountered little privileged email, and had made
only a handful of isolated rulings in otherwise routine cases that email
could be used for privileged material.91 In 1995, the American Bar
Association tackled “rapidly developing technology.”92 In Formal
Opinion 95-398, the ABA considered third-party maintenance of
networks and “terminal[s]” containing clients’ information.93 The ABA
states that when a non-attorney accesses client files in this context,
attorneys must supervise the relationship to ensure that the nonattorneys understand their obligations and “make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the service provider will not make unauthorized disclosures
of client information.”94
This ruling was consistent with guidance from Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.6 and with practices concerning third-party
access to attorney data. Opinion 95-398 also references Rule 5.3,
Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants. This rule requires
firms to establish policies to uphold confidentiality requirements, and
89. Alaska Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 98-2 (1998) (“While it is not necessary to seek specific client
consent to the use of unencrypted e-mail, clients should nonetheless be advised, and cautioned, that the
communications are not absolutely secure.”); District of Columbia Bar Ass’n, Op. No. 281 (1998); Ill.
State Bar Ass’n Advisory, Op. on Prof’l Conduct No. 96-10 (1997); Kentucky Bar Ass’n, Advisory
Ethics Op. KBA E-403 (1998) (“[A] lawyer does not violate Rule 1.6 by communicating with a client
using electronic mail services, including the Internet, without encryption. Nor is it necessary, as some
commentators have suggested, to seek specific client consent to the use of unencrypted e-mail.”); Ass’n
of the Bar of the City of New York, Formal Op. 1998-2 (1998) (“Different levels of security on the
Internet as well as off the Internet would seem to be appropriate for matters of differing sensitivity. But
we do not believe that a blanket prohibition on the use of e-mail for client communications is either
necessary or appropriate.”); New York State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 709 (1998); State
Bar Ass’n of N. Dakota, Ethics Comm., Op. 97-09 (1997) (“[R]outine matter with clients and/or other
lawyer jointly representing clients via unencrypted e-mail carries adequate assurances, and/or a
reasonable expection, or confidentiality.”); Orange Cnty. Bar Ass’n, Professionalism and Ethics Comm.,
Formal Op. No. 97-002 (1997) (“The use of encrypted e-mail is encouraged, but not required.”);
Vermont Bar Ass’n, Advisory Ethics Op. 97-05 (1997) (“The Committee believes that any lawyer may
use e-mail and the internet . . . .”).
90. State Bar of Arizona, Ethics Op. 97-04 (1997) (“Lawyers may want to have the e-mail
encrypted with a password known only to the lawyer and client so that there is no inadvertent disclosure
of confidential information.”); Iowa Bar Ass’n, Op. 97-01 (1997); Missouri Informal Advisory Ops.
990007, 980029, 970230, and 970161; Pennsylvania Bar Ass’n Comm. On Legal Ethics, Op. 97-130
(1997) (lawyers must obtain consent to use unencrypted email for sensitive communications); North
Carolina Ethics Op. RPC 215 (1995).
91. See, e.g., Amylin Pharma., Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., No. 96cv2061-JM, 1998 WL
849078 (D. Cal. 1998); Int’l Marine Carriers, Inc. v. United States, No. 9510670, 1997 WL 160371, at *
3 (D.N.Y 1997); Nat’l Emp’t Serv. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 93-2528-G, 1994 WL 878920, at
* 3 (Mass. 1994).
92. ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-398 (1995).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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attorneys must ensure that nonlawyers behave appropriately. Opinion
95-398 found that “a lawyer might be well-advised to secure from the
service provider in writing, along with or apart from any written contract
for services that might exist, a written statement of the service
provider’s assurance of confidentiality.”95 The ABA has applied this
rule to many kinds of outsiders hired by attorneys, from accounting, to
photocopying, to paper disposal, and to technical vendors with access to
confidential databases.96
A. ABA Formal Opinion 99-413
In 1999, inspired by Professor Hricik’s calming assurances that email
should be assumed private, the ABA responded to the states’ patchwork
ethical opinions with Formal Opinion No. 99-413, declaring that email
encryption was generally not necessary to protect client confidence:97
A lawyer may transmit information relating to the representation of a
client by unencrypted e-mail sent over the Internet without violating the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1998) because the mode of
transmission affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from a
technological and legal standpoint. The same privacy accorded U.S. and
commercial mail, land-line telephonic transmissions, and facsimiles
applies to Internet e-mail. A lawyer should consult with the client and
follow her instructions, however, as to the mode of transmitting highly
sensitive information relating to the client’s representation.98

The ABA cited to Professor Hricik constantly, in thirteen footnotes out
of forty.99 The ABA compared email to many other forms of
communication: commercial and U.S. postal mail, telephones, cordless
and cellular phones, and facsimile.100 The ABA found that email was
technically insecure, like other means of transmission, but that
“interception or dissemination is a violation of the law,” as with other
technologies.101
The ABA addressed third-party access to email, when provided
through an OSP—at that time a service like AOL. The ABA suggests
that the security policies, protection from outside hackers, and privacy
policies restricting internal OSP access, could affect whether a user has
95. Id. at 2.
96. The ABA issued an almost identical opinion in 2008, adding some requirements for
outsourcing attorneys. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451
(2008).
97. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 1 (1999).
98. Id.
99. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999).
100. Id. at 3–6.
101. Id. at 1.
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a reasonable expectation of privacy. The ABA then generalized that
providers like AOL to have “a formal policy that narrowly restricts the
bases on which system administrators and OSP agents are permitted to
examine user e-mail”—that is, the ABA assumed the ISP had a privacy
policy that protects the user’s privacy, as AOL’s did.102
The ABA also claimed that “irrespective of the OSP’s formal policy,”
access is limited by law. The ABA cited the ECPA to claim that
“federal law imposes limits on the ability of OSP administrators to
inspect user e-mail, irrespective of the OSP’s formal policy. Inspection
is limited by the ECPA . . . Further, . . . disclosure of those
communications for purposes other than those provided by the statute is
prohibited.”103 The ABA confidently concluded that “[t]he same
privacy accorded U.S. and commercial mail, land-line telephonic
transmissions, and facsimiles applies to Internet e-mail.”104
As with similar opinions, the ABA suggested an exception that
threatened to swallow the entire rule. Attorneys should consult their
clients when “information being transmitted is so highly sensitive that
extraordinary measures to protect the transmission are warranted.”105
ECPA is, of course, the law in question.
It is difficult to overstate experts’ reliance on ECPA for the
expectation of privacy. Hricik, the ABA, and state bars all explicitly
rely on ECPA protections to support a reasonable expectation of
privacy.106 The ABA states that it is unreasonable to avoid unencrypted
email “when unauthorized interception or dissemination of the
information is a violation of the law.”107
Professor Hricik was deeply concerned with malicious interception,
and he used ECPA to show an expectation of privacy in this type of
hacker interception.108 I agree with him on this point, but not on his
broad categorization of ECPA as a watertight barrier to a third party’s
inspection of private emails.109 The ABA, at least in 1999, also rested
on ECPA as protecting communications, emphasizing the business
requirements as limiting OSP access under ECPA.110
102. Id. at 7.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id. at 1.
105. Id. at 10.
106. Liebesman, supra note 73, at 894.
107. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 1 (1999).
108. See Hricik, supra note 4, at 471–72.
109. Hricik & Fallingham, supra note 6, at 283 (“In addition, while an on-line ISP could,
theoretically, read every single message sent within its system, it is unlawful to do so. Under federal
law, a provider of electronic communications services may intercept messages only if it is ‘in the normal
course of his employment . . . .’”).
110. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 8 (1999). (“Moreover,
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Shortly after, many local bar associations followed the ABA’s lead
and issued opinions that encrypted email was not necessary to comply
with ethical obligations, often with a requirement to warn clients or
discuss risks including Delaware, Florida, Maine, Utah, and Virginia.111
To this day, Texas has no opinion related to the matter, causing conflict
with other state ethical obligations of diligent representation and of
confidentiality.112
After this opinion, many industry and information specific data
privacy laws passed around the world. These laws, not even considered
in 1999, are now the focus of entire books, classes, conferences, and
training programs.113 Massachusetts implemented a 2010 data privacy
law with exacting requirements for “personal information” of
Massachusetts residents in any jurisdiction.114 Though the requirements
are not technology-specific, practitioners have interpreted them to
require encryption of data and correspondence containing personal
information.115
The ABA International Privacy Law Working Group has posted
guides to many data privacy laws relevant to attorneys, including the
FTC’s requirements, the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the EU/US
Privacy Safe harbor, and privacy requirements in Australia, Canada, the
European Union, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom.116 In February 2012, the ABA adopted a resolution
federal law imposes limits on the ability of OSP administrators to inspect user e-mail, irrespective of the
OSP’s formal policy. Inspection is limited by the ECPA to purposes ‘necessary to the rendition of
services’ or to the protection of ‘rights or property.’ Further, even if an OSP administrator lawfully
inspects user e-mail within the narrow limits defined by the ECPA, the disclosure of those
communications for purposes other than those provided by the statute is prohibited.”).
111. Delaware State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 2001-2 (2001); Florida State Bar
Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 00-4 (2000); Maine Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 195 (2008);
The Supreme Court of Ohio, Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, Op. No. 99-2
(199); Utah State Bar, Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op.No. 00-01 (2000); Virginia Legal Ethics, Op.
1791 (2003); Los Angeles Cnty. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. No. 514 (2005) (“Lawyers are not required to
encrypt e-mail containing confidential client communications because e-mail poses no greater risk of
interception and disclosure than regular mail, phones or faxes.”).
112. See Tom Mighell, The Cyber-Ethical Criminal Defense Lawyer (Or, How Not to Commit
Malpractice with Your Technology), 73 TEX. B.J. 540 (2010).
113. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE ET AL., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (2d ed. 2005).
Information for practitioners can be found at the ABA website. ABA LEGAL TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE
CENTER, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/ (last
visited Aug. 25, 2012).
114. Rodney S. Dowell, Data Privacy Part I: Complying with New Regulations to Keep
Confidential Personal Information Protected, 17 MASS. LAW. J. 6Feb. 2010, at 6.
115. See Rodney S. Dowell, Data Privacy II: Lock It Down, MASS LAW. J., Mar. 2010, at 8.
116. ABA
SECTION
OF
INTERNATIONAL
LAW,http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/committees/industries/information_services_technology/privac
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that local courts should “consider and respect, as appropriate” foreign
data privacy laws in civil litigation.117 Any attorney dealing with
sensitive information should be aware of the large and growing body of
data privacy laws.
B. State Bar of California, Formal Opinion 2010-179
In 2010, the State Bar of California issued a thoughtful, generally
applicable opinion, alongside local bar associations issuing their own
specific opinions.118 The State Bar of California Formal Opinion 2010179 is a considered dialogue on the risks of email and other technologies
such as wireless networks.119 This opinion is recognized as the authority
on the issues of wireless computing for attorneys.120 The California
Formal Opinion is based on a scenario involving an attorney with a
firm-maintained laptop using a public wireless connection, or his own
personal wireless connection at his home.
The opinion starts with a warning that technology-based ethics
opinions will become outdated, and then examines the issues
carefully.121 The State Bar of California is intentionally opaque about
technology, suggesting that it is a fact-specific inquiry that will depend
on many factors, and also that it will change.122 The Opinion outlines
six factors for attorneys to consider.123
First, the California Opinion weighs the attorney’s own ability to
“assess the level of security afforded by the technology.”124 These
security factors include consideration of how the technology differs
from others, whether reasonable precautions may increase the level of
security, and limitations on who can access the communications.125 The
Opinion notes that this is an inquiry that requires technical knowledge
and finds that attorneys owe clients a “basic understanding of the
electronic protections afforded by the technology they use,” even

y.shtml (last visited Aug. 25, 2012).
117. ABA H.D. Res. 103 (2012).
118. Kristina Horton Flaherty, Ethical Issues Bedevil Lawyer E-Mail, CAL. B. J., May 2001,
available at http://archive.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/2cbj/01may/page16-1.htm.
119. Cal. State Bar Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. No. 2010-179 (2010).
120. Ben Kerschberg, Your Ethical and Legal Duties When Using Wireless Networks, FORBES,
Dec. 21, 2011, available at, http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkerschberg/2011/12/12/your-ethical-andlegal-duties-when-using-wireless-networks/.
121. Cal. State Bar Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. No. 2010-179 at *1
(2010).
122. See id.
123. Id. at *3–6.
124. Id. at *3.
125. Id. at *3–4.
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seeking outside advice to do so.126 This technology knowledge is
critical to allow the attorney to make an informed decision and consider
the technical factors demanded by the Opinion.127
The remaining five factors are the legal impact of third-party access,
the sensitivity of the information, the possible impact of inadvertent
disclosure on privilege or confidentiality, urgency, and the client’s
instructions.128
To address the hypothetical scenario, the committee finds that the
attorney can use the firm laptop for confidential information because of
the restricted access to appropriate authorized agents at the firm,
including other personnel trained in this area. However, the court finds
that he should not use his personal wireless network without
“appropriate security features.” He may need encryption, firewalls, or
other security features to use the public network, or “avoid using the
public wireless connection entirely,” depending on the information’s
sensitivity.129 In all situations, the Opinion requires attorneys to inform
their clients of the risks of technologies.
The advice to protect confidential information on a public and
attorney’s own home router is based on illegal, “hacker” interception
into systems as well as the easily intercepted unencrypted data
transfer.130 This access is either clearly illegal, such as a hacker stealing
information from the router, or questionably legal, such as access by a
hotspot owner with clear privacy policies. In either context, the
California Bar Association nevertheless finds an ethical duty for
attorneys to avoid or mitigate the risk.
The California Opinion shows the danger of technology-specific
ethics opinions. The ABA’s 1999 opinion’s specific combination of
privacy policies, technology, and law may collapse when technology
changes. In this case, carelessly sending unencrypted email to a public
server, which violated no duty in 1999, becomes an unacceptable risk
when combined with a new, technical security risk: a public wireless
router. Unlike the ABA, the State Bar of California places an explicit
duty on attorneys to stay informed about the technologies and to be able
to explain risks.
C. 2011 ABA Formal Opinion 11-459
In 2011, the ABA responded to issues with privilege and ethic duties
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at *5.
See id. at *5.
Id. at *5–6.
See id. at *7.
Id. at *7 n.21.
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in employee email and issued Formal Opinion 11-459, warning
attorneys to advise clients to avoid workplace email and computers.131
In this opinion, the ABA carved out a specific exception to its previous
1999 opinion. This Opinion is an excellent start toward security and
email and acknowledges serious risks arising from corresponding with
clients using their employer’s resources. Employees and their attorneys
should never assume an expectation of privacy in work email.
Employers have long used email monitoring to monitor everything
from work activities to company regulations concerning extracurricular
behavior for all levels of employees. A chief executive of Boeing was
fired when email showed an affair with a subordinate, as well as
language inappropriate under company policy.132 Many company
policies spell out that email belongs to the employer, not the
employee.133
Many employee contracts and user agreements
specifically show employees that their email and use of the employer
network is not private.134 A 2002 report to Congress of Fortune 500
companies found that every company stored both business and personal
employee email, more than 40% routinely monitored it, and the
remaining companies inspected it when needed.135 Some companies use
software to search for keywords and evaluate email.136
In recent years, courts have battled through the unsettled issue of
workplace email.137 Some have found very serious waivers associated
with employees using workplace email and workplace computers for
private communications, while some have maintained privilege despite
employer policies. The opinions show a case-by-case inquiry, muddling
through privacy issues in email, sometimes deferring to the employer’s
policies, and sometimes not.
Early opinions favored employers. At the time of the 1999 ABA
opinion, employers had been virtually undefeated in courts, obtaining
rights to emails and other employee communication. At the time, a
commenter in the ABA Journal analogized invasive employer rights to

131. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011).
132. Jared Sandberg, Monitoring of Workers Is Boss’s Right but Why Not Include Top Brass?,
ST .
J.,
May
18,
2005,
available
at
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111636541232736178,00.html.
133. NANCY FLYNN & RANDOLPH KAHN, E-MAIL RULES: A BUSINESS GUIDE TO MANAGING
POLICIES, SECURITY AND LEGAL ISSUES FOR E-MAIL AND DIGITAL COMMUNICATION (2003).
134. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY: COMPUTER-USE MONITORING
PRACTICES AND POLICIES OF SELECTED COMPANIES (2002).
135. Id. at 6.
136. Id. at 7–8.
137. See generally Michael Z. Green, Against Employer Dumpster-Diving for Email, 64 S.C. L.
REV. 323 (2012).
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snoop on email to installing a camera in the men’s room.138 Courts
consistently found that employee emails were subject to interception and
adverse use.
In 1996, a Pennsylvania court found that despite an expectation of
privacy in threatening and vulgar emails sent using an employer’s email
address and network, that interception was not a substantial and highly
offensive invasion of privacy.139 In 1998, an Illinois court upheld a
client of Andersen Consulting divulging Andersen’s emails sent over the
client’s mail system to the public via the Wall Street Journal.140 Two
unpublished California cases also recognized the rights of an employer
to intercept and use email, even with California’s unique privacy
laws.141 By the late 1990s, it seemed employees had no statutory
remedy for employer snooping on their email.142
Later, some courts did protected employee emails on a case-by-case
basis, especially with unclear privacy policies or efforts by employees to
maintain privacy. New York courts protected a limited amount of
material sent through a personal email address when the employee
attempted to remove the material from an employer’s laptop,143 as well
as an employee using personal email at work.144 Massachusetts courts
protected well-labeled documents on a company laptop, as well as email
sent through a personal email address, even when company policy
warned about employee privacy.145 A District of Columbia District
Court even protected a Department of Justice prosecutor who used his
work email address for personal, attorney–client communication, based
on his ignorance of the Department policies and attempts to delete the
mail.146
Other cases found sweeping waivers of privilege when employees
used company email or company equipment for personal emails.
Widely followed cases decided in 2006 and 2007 enforced employers’
terms of service and allowed not only interception but adverse use
138. Don J. DeBenedictis, E-Mail Snoops, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1990, at 27.
139. Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
140. See Andersen Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
141. Peter Schnaitman, Comment, Building a Community Through Workplace E-mail: The New
Privacy Frontier, 5 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 177, 197–201 (1999) (citing Bourke v. Nissan
Motor Co., No. B068705 (Cal. Ct.. App. July 26, 1993); Shoars v. Epson, America, Inc., No. SWC
112749 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 1990)).
142. Schnaitman, supra note 141, at 216.
143. Curto v. Med. Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2007 WL 1452106 (E.D.N.Y.
May 15, 2007).
144. Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
145. Fiber Materials Inc. v. Subilia, 974 A.2d 918 (Me. 2009); Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs. v.
Evans, 24 Mass. L. Rptr. 436 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
146. See Convertino v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 674 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2009).
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against employees. In Scott v. Beth Israel Medical Center,147 a
physician had corresponded with his personal attorney using the
hospital’s network. The hospital policy stated that all messages were
property of the hospital and that no personal use was allowed.148 The
New York trial court found that these policies diminished any
expectation of confidentiality, allowing the hospital to use those e-mails
in a later suit claiming wrongful termination.149
In Kaufman v. Sungard Investment Systems, a New Jersey court
applied New Jersey privilege law to determine privilege in emails sent
on a company email system.150 In that case, the policy warned:
The Company has the right to access and inspect all electronic systems
and physical property belonging to it. Employees should not expect that
any items created with, stored on, or stored within Company property will
remain private. This includes desk drawers, even if protected with a lock;
and computer files and electronic mail, even if protected with a
password.151

The company also warned that it “reserves the right to monitor and
inspect network or Internet usage and e-mail” and “e-mail may be
subject to monitoring, search, or inspection at any time.”152 Under New
Jersey law, disclosure to a third party “without coercion and with
knowledge of his right or privilege” waives the privilege.153 The court
found that disclosure to an employer by using an employer’s email
system was deliberate and waived privilege.154
In 2011, two cases decided within months of each other reached
radically different conclusions about privilege in emails sent by personal
attorneys to employer-provided networks. In Holmes v. Petrovich
Development Co., an employee used her work email and computer to
communicate with her attorney about a work dispute.155 The court
easily found that these emails were not privileged, comparing it to
“consulting her attorney in one of [her employer’s] conference rooms, in
a loud voice, with the door open, yet unreasonably expecting that the
conversation overheard by [her employer] would be privileged.”156
At the same time, in Stengart v. Loving Care, Inc., a New Jersey court

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438–39 (Sup. Ct. 2007).
Id. at 439.
Id. at 441.
Kaufman v. SunGard Inv. Sys., No. 05-cv-1236, 2006 WL 1307882 (D.N.J. 2006).
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *3 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-29 (1960)).
Id. at *4.
Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878, 886–87 (App. 2011).
Id. at 896.
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found that emails sent with a personal, Internet-based email account
from a work terminal remained privileged, where the employer’s policy
about privacy in such situations is unclear.157 In that case, an attorney
had used a work computer to access a personal, password-protected
email service. The court found that the employee was “unsophisticated
in the use of computers and did not know that [her employer] could read
communications sent on her Yahoo account.”158 Further, the court
found an ethical violation with the intercepted messages. These
messages were recorded in temporary storage on the laptop’s hard drive,
in a “cache” folder, without the employee’s knowledge.159 The
employer forensically recovered and used their contents claiming they
were “left” on the laptop.160 The court found that the attorneys who
discovered these messages violated their ethical duty by not treating
them as “inadvertent” disclosures and notifying opposing counsel.161
In response to this conflict, the ABA issued two opinions based on
the same fact pattern, resembling Holmes and Stengart. In 2011, the
ABA issued Formal Opinions 11-459 and 11-460 to address concerns
with client communications and also how to treat recovered
documents.162 The ABA described the status of the law as “evolving”
and stated that courts have reached “different conclusions.”163 The
formal opinions are based on the same hypothetical situation: a client
seeking counsel in an employment dispute, where waiver through use of
the employer’s resources is clearly problematic.164 She has a company
laptop assigned for her exclusive use.165 Employees regularly use their
laptops for personal email, even though the company has a right of
access to any information on the laptop.166 Opinion 11-459 addresses
the issues with the client using her work computer and email address;
Opinion 11-460 addresses the duties of the attorney regarding the
contents of the laptop, containing privileged information.167
Opinion 11-459 takes on the issues of privacy in employee email.
Employers regularly require employees to waive privacy rights in
employer email and devices. The ABA notes danger when an employer
157. Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010).
158. Id. at 665.
159. Id. at 666.
160. Id. at 665–66.
161. Id. at 666.
162. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011); ABA Comm. on
Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011).
163. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011).
164. Id. at 1–2.
165. Id. at 1.
166. Id.
167. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011).
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can freely view confidential information, as well as the risk of thirdparty subpoenas for the employer’s stored data.168 The ABA finds that
an attorney should assume employers can access all emails sent to a
workplace email address, as well as private mail accessed on a
workplace device, threatening confidentiality and possibly privilege.169
The ABA warns attorneys about employers’ restrictive privacy
policies, and advises attorneys to assume that employees have
contracted away their expectation of privacy in employer emails and
devices. Given the risk of access by others and possible waiver of
privilege, attorneys should “typically” advise their clients to avoid
workplace email and all workplace devices.170 Appropriate actions
include refraining from sending email to a workplace email address, as
well as cautioning the client against using the workplace email or a
workplace device to communicate, “at least for substantive e-mails with
counsel.”171 The ABA’s conclusion is for all seasons, all technologies,
and all clients. The ABA finds:
Whenever a lawyer communicates with a client by e-mail, the lawyer
must first consider whether, given the client’s situation, there is
significant risk that third parties will have access to the communications.
If so, the lawyer must take reasonable care to protect the confidentiality
of the communications by giving appropriately tailored advice to the
client.172

Formal Opinion 11-460 settles that Model Rule 4.4, related to
inadvertent document disclosure, does not apply in this context. “[A]
document is not ‘inadvertently sent’ when it is retrieved by a third
person from a public or private place where it is stored or left.”173 The
Opinion does acknowledge that other ethical or evidentiary rules might
govern in a particular jurisdiction.174
The ABA’s scenario contains an obvious conflict, because the
employee’s dispute is with the party that controls the e-mail. The ABA
warns in this context that “even seemingly ministerial communications
involving matters such as scheduling can have substantive
ramifications.”175 The ABA suggests that in other contexts, risks may

168. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011).
169. Id. (“Unless a lawyer has reason to believe otherwise, a lawyer ordinarily should assume that
an employer’s internal policy allows for access to the employee’s e-mails sent to or from a workplace
device or system.”).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011).
174. Id.
175. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

27

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 7

628

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

vary, and that attorney’s should advise their clients about the danger of
third-party access to these communications.176
The Opinion suggests that other contexts could allow third-party
access as well, such as a shared family computer in a matrimonial
dispute, a borrowed computer, or a public computer, including a library
or hotel computer.177 Though these situations are obviously problematic
to privacy, the ABA does not offer specific guidance for these
situations. The ABA does not mention any technical solution, such as
encryption, in the context of third-party access, nor discuss the
attorney’s duty to understand technology.
The ABA’s newfound concern about privacy policies in employer
networks updates the broad assumptions in the 1999 opinion. In 1999,
the ABA did not even consider the policies of a “private system,”
instead worrying about careless misdirection within the system, such as
“throughout a law firm.”178 The ABA had previously assumed that
messages on a private network would relate to a common entity, because
private networks contained only users with a duty to that common
entity.179 Thus, all the users within the firm would have a common duty
to the confidences of the firm clients. This assumption about the
technology proved to be false. The 2011 opinion showed a world in
which the network’s common duty fails to match the content of the
message, that is a private network message used for unintended
purposes.
The 2011 opinion was also forced to address the provider’s duty to an
individual user’s mail. The ABA had only considered this in the context
of consumer mail and Internet providers. The ABA had assumed that
service providers would have a duty of privacy to their account holders,
as AOL did. This presents a situation the 1999 opinion did not
contemplate: the provider has no duty of privacy to its user; in fact, it
has contracted for the exact opposite.
The ABA also reversed its position on the power of ECPA to protect
email users. Adverse access and use of employer email or private mail
accessed on an employer’s device would be impossible under the ECPA
interpretation solidified in the ABA’s 1999 Opinion, which claimed that
inspection and disclosure were prohibited by federal law “irrespective of
the OSP’s formal policy.”180 All relevant provisions of ECPA have

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999).
179. Id. (“[A]ll members of a firm owe a duty of confidentiality to each of the firm’s clients.
Further, unintended disclosures to individuals within a client’s private e-mail network are unlikely to be
harmful to the client.”).
180. Id.
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always contained exceptions for consent, so the OSP’s formal policy is
critical to decide what access is authorized.
Thus, the ABA
reconsidered in 2011, finding that the limits were not irrespective of
employer’s policies. Privacy policies are indeed able to override the
federal law the ABA previously trusted.
In 1998, Professor Hricik compared email to a package sent through a
commercial service, such as Federal Express, which warns in fine print
that FedEx can inspect any package.181 He claimed that obtaining truly
informed consent about authorized access before using FedEx was
unreasonable, and compared FedEx’s rights to an OSP’s “limited right
to monitor lawfully e-mail.”182 As time went on, those limits became
less limiting as courts found that providers could contract for their right
to monitor, assuming policies were clear, at least in the case of
employers. The privacy policy can now control that right, removing
ECPA’s limitations by consent.183
The 2011 Formal Opinion is critical because it shows that a user’s
consent is able to override the law’s default privacy limits and to
eliminate the general, assumed expectation of privacy. This Opinion
destroys generalized conclusions and requires focusing on the policies
of the service provider, not the character of the technical specifications,
as the most important element to determine user’s privacy. Unlike in
1999, this suggests privacy must be determined on a case-by-case basis,
and that provider’s policies are critical.

181. Hricik, supra note 4, at 492. The current FedEx terms are that “[Fedex] may, at our sole
discretion, open and inspect any shipment without notice.” FedEx Services Express Terms and
Conditions, FEDEX, http://www.fedex.com/us/service-guide/terms/express-ground/index.html (last
visited Sept. 5, 2012). These terms have been upheld to serve a legitimate business interest. United
States v. Young, 153 F.3d 1079, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 1998). These terms have also been held to reduce
expectation of privacy, at least for a spilled shipment of drugs. United States v. Barry, 673 F.2d 912,
917 (6th Cir. 1982).
182. Hricik, supra note 4, at 492.
183. Perhaps one critical distinction is sealing the message. In a confidential FedEx delivery,
perhaps even a FedEx delivery to a client’s workplace, the envelope is sealed and presumably labeled,
as reasonable measures taken to ensure confidentiality. Even in 1998, email was considered “unsealed”
and compared to a postcard, which never carries an expectation of privacy. Hricik himself was only
able to overcome the postcard analogy with the assumption that ECPA prohibited access and that email
ends with storage on the recipient’s private computer alone. Both are untrue in the context of modern
employee email. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834 (E.D. Pa 1996), aff’d, 521
U.S. 844 (1997) (“Unlike postal mail, simple e-mail generally is not ‘sealed’ or secure, and can be
accessed or viewed on intermediate computers between the sender and recipient (unless the message is
encrypted).”); Hricik, supra note 4, at 461 (“Some say that sending an Internet e-mail is like sending a
postcard, not a sealed envelope. Others disagree, stating that ‘e-mail is inherently more secure than
ordinary mail since it is delivered right to the computer of the recipient.’”).
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D. ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Technology and Confidentiality
Rule Changes
After years of preparation, papers, and comments, in February 2012,
the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 released a final revised draft of
the commission’s proposals to update rules relevant to technology and
confidentiality issues.184 The relevant proposals included amendments
to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 Competence; Rule 6, Duty
of Confidentiality; and Rule 4.4, Respect for the Rights of Third
Persons.185 In August 2012, the ABA passed the amendments to the
Model Rules with only small modification.186
The most fundamental amendment is to the Rule 1.1, Competence,
Comment 6, Maintaining Competence. Previously the comment
required attorneys to “keep abreast of changes in law and practice.” The
amendment adds “including the benefits and risks associated with
technology.”187 This mirrors the California requirement that attorneys
must be knowledgeable about technology in order to inform clients of
risks or obtain consent. The Committee describes this requirement as
“some awareness of the basic features of technology” and notes that the
amendment “does not impose any new obligations on lawyers.”188
Rule 1.6, Confidentiality, has a change, adding a section (c): “A
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or
unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information
relating to representation of a client.”189 Adding reasonable security
measures for stored electronic data has an intuitive quality that makes
one wonder why it was previously relegated to Comment 16 for
disclosure by an attorney or his agents, or to Comment 17 for
transmissions only. Obviously, it is illegal to break into a law firm and
steal documents, but shouldn’t an attorney at least lock the door? The
Committee describes this rule as needed “in light of the pervasive use of
technology to store and transmit confidential client information.”190
184. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS 20/20, FOR COMMENT BY APRIL 2, 2012: FINAL REVISED DRAFTS
(Feb. 21, 2012).
185. The proposals also address issues in technology use in client development, outsourcing,
practice pending admission, and admission by motion. Id.
186. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 105A REVISED
(2012),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120808_revised_resolution
_105a_as_amended.authcheckdam.pdf; Bloomberg BNA, Ethics 20/20 Rule Changes Approved by ABA
Delegates With Little Opposition, Aug. 15, 2012.
187. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS 20/20, REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTIONS FOR COMMENT:
TECHNOLOGY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 5 (Feb. 21, 2012).
188. Id. at 15–16.
189. Id. at 8.
190. Id. at 15.
OF FIRST SET OF COMMISSION PROPOSALS

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss2/7

30

Bolin: Risky Mail: Concerns in Confidential Attorney-Client Email

2012]

RISKY MAIL

631

The Committee describes three scenarios that encourage adoption of
Rule 1.6(c): misdirection of e-mail, hackers accessing client data, and
employee agents posting confidential information on the Internet. This
Rule is intended “to make clear that lawyers have an ethical obligation
to make reasonable efforts to prevent these types of disclosures, such as
by using reasonably available administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards.”191 The Committee declined to offer technology-specific
recommendations in the rules, instead outlining general principles.
The Committee adds a lengthy provision to Comment 16.192 The
Comment clarifies that inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure is not a
violation if “the lawyer has made reasonable efforts to prevent the
access or disclosure.” This analysis uses four factors: sensitivity of the
information, likelihood of disclosure without security measures, cost of
security measures, and the extent to which the safeguards would affect
the lawyer’s ability to represent clients. However, the Committee leaves
the bulk of Comment 17 unchanged. Comment 17 applies to
“transmitting a communication” and states that “[t]his duty, however,
does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the
method of communication offers a reasonable expectation of
privacy.”193
Comments 16 and 17 add notes that federal and state privacy laws are
beyond the scope of the rules, and that lawyers may need to take
additional steps while communicating information and after
unauthorized access. The Committee added these statements to “remind
lawyers that other laws and regulations impose confidentiality-related
obligations beyond those that are identified in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.”194
Rule 4.4, Respect for Rights of Third Persons, addresses an attorney’s
duty to notify a sender of inadvertent document disclosure. The

191. Id. at 17.
192. Id. at 11–12 (“The unauthorized access to, or the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of,
confidential information does not constitute a violation of paragraph (c) if the lawyer has made
reasonable efforts to prevent the access or disclosure. Factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of the lawyer’s efforts include the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of
disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the
difficulty of implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the
lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g. by making a device or important piece of software excessively
difficult to use). A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by
this Rule or may give informed consent to forego security measures that would otherwise be required by
this Rule. Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps to safeguard a client’s information
in order to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that govern data privacy or that impose
notification requirements upon the loss of, or unauthorized access to, electronic information, is beyond
the scope of these Rules.”).
193. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 17 (2009).
194. Id. at 18.
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amendments add “electronically stored information” to the previous
“documents.”195 Amendments to Comment 2 defines electronically
stored information as “email and other forms of electronically stored
information, including embedded data (commonly referred to as
‘metadata’), that is subject to being put into readable form.” “A
document of electronically stored information is inadvertently sent when
it is accidentally transmitted to an unintended recipient, such as when a
letter is misaddressed or when a document or electronic stored
information is accidentally included in discovery.”196 As before, Rule
4.4 requires attorneys to notify the sender, but other requirements will
vary. The Committee describes this information as “intentionally sent,
but to the wrong person.”197 At passage, the suggestion in Comment 3
was modified to suggest that attorneys may wish to “delete” instead of
“return” misdirected email.198
The Committee also recommended that the ABA sponsor a
centralized website to host the many resources and projects the ABA has
undertaken regarding technology in law practice, including data security
standards. The ABA has several resources with information on these
issues, including the ABA Legal Technology Resource Center. The
Committee found that practitioners sought a central location for this
information.199
The ABA amendments are much-needed amendments to the Model
Rules, including a critical provision requiring attorneys to maintain
knowledge of technology. The amendments reflect the need to protect
electronic communications, just as attorneys would paper documents,
and to consider the risks for confidentiality in use of technology.
III. CONTINUING PRIVACY ISSUES IN EMAIL
Years after the ABA’s confident conclusion that the existing law
protected privacy in email identically to other means of communication,
and that interception was difficult and illegal, the issue of email privacy
remains unresolved. Privacy in email has eroded in at least one
category, employer mail, and remains in flux generally speaking. Email
forces a case-by-case inquiry because email providers can have clear
policies about expectations for users, as the ABA acknowledged in
2011. Attorneys should be wary of this uncertainty, of the danger of
195. Id. at 13.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 19 (emphasis omitted).
198. BNA Bloomberg, supra n. 186. This suggestion was made by Ellen Flannery, a partner at
Covington & Burling.
199. Id. at 14.
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privacy policy waivers, and of unrelated disclosure to third parties in
compliance with other cases.
A. No Settled Expectation of Privacy in Email
The general expectation of privacy in email in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence remains unresolved. Though expectation of privacy is not
identical to confidentiality, the concepts are related and courts often rely
on Fourth Amendment protections to analyze confidentiality. When
“reasonable expectation of privacy” is not settled, neither is privacy for
confidential information between attorneys and clients. Statutes allow
warrantless searches to email, and the challenge to these statutes in the
context of the Fourth Amendment is ongoing.200 In 2013, Google
announced a bold policy that it would require warrants for cloud or
email data, though contrary to current law.201
Email has found itself at a rough intersection between fundamental
search and seizure principles: the generalized, person-based Katz inquiry
of reasonable expectation of privacy, the “third party” doctrine of Miller
and significant statutory challenges, with outdated, unclear guidance
from Congress. When analyzing expectation of privacy in a Fourth
Amendment context, courts follow Katz, finding whether individual has
a subjective expectation of privacy and whether society would consider
that expectation reasonable. In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court
changed the dialogue about the Fourth Amendment with a new
framework.202 Instead of focusing on the object searched, the Court
turned to the target, developing the “reasonable expectation of privacy
test,” as developed in Justice Harlan’s dissent and subsequent cases.
This analysis, now used in all Fourth Amendment inquiry, asks whether
a subject has an actual expectation of privacy (subjective prong) and
whether society considers it reasonable (objective prong).203 The
subjective prong requires an intent to keep the information private as
well as reasonable efforts to maintain privacy.204
In United States v. Miller, the Court established the third party rule,
finding a subject forfeits privacy in information known to and divulged
to a third party. Miller contested a subpoena for bank records, which the
200. See generally Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored
E-Mail, U. CHI. LEGAL F. at 121 (2008).
201. David Kravets, Google Tells Cops to Get Warrants for User E-Mail, Cloud Data, WIRED,
Jan. 23, 2013.
202. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring).
203. Id.; see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
204. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”).
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Court found were “revealed to a third party,” and thus the Fourth
Amendment did not prohibit disclosure to government authorities.205
“All of the documents obtained, including financial statements and
deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business.”206 Depending on the facts and the steps taken by the parties,
third-party access can also destroy confidentiality—for example,
documents that could have been inspected by an accountant.207
The conflict of Katz and Miller is ongoing in this context. Email is
technically accessible by third parties, ISPs, yet resists easy
classification as information freely given to others. Email also has its
own very complicated set of privacy policies and obsolete statutes. This
issue is surprisingly unsettled, and is the subject of much commentary
and speculation.208 Today, only one published, circuit court opinion
addresses the issue of general privacy expectations in email, over ten
years after the ABA confidently established privacy interest in email.209
The unlikely hero of email privacy has become Steven Warshak,
infomercial peddler of the erectile dysfunction drug “Enzyte” and star of
an episode of CNBC’s dramatic “American Greed” featuring elaborate
financial scams.210 In 2005, federal agents investigated Warshak’s
company, Berkeley Premium Nutraceuticals, Inc. As part of that
investigation, the government requested email from Warshak’s Internet
service provider, NuVox, and an email account supplied by that
company, as well as email provided by Yahoo for Warshak and
others.211
Federal agents used an order authorized by ECPA, the Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f), to order NuVox to preserve
all incoming and outgoing mail.212 Warshak accessed his mail by
downloading it to his personal computer and deleting it from NuVox’s
servers; without this order, no copies would exist.213 The government
205. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976).
206. Id. at 442.
207. See First Interstate Bank of Or., N.A. v. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 127 F.R.D. 186, 189 (D. Or.
1989).
208. See generally Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored
E-Mail, U. CHI. LEGAL F. at 121 (2008).
209. See Casey Perry, U.S. v. Warshak: Will Fourth Amendment Protection Be Delivered to Your
Inbox?, 12 N.C. .J. L. & TECH. 345, 348–49 (2011).
210. American Greed, CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/id/35988285/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2012).
211. Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 460 (6th Cir. 2007).
212. Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266, 283 (6th Cir. 2010); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (2009) (“A
provider of wire or electronic communication services or a remote computing service, upon the request
of a governmental entity, shall take all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its
possession pending the issuance of a court order or other process.”).
213. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 283 n.14.
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then obtained a subpoena using ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), for
disclosure of the information.214 NuVox was required to surrender
27,000 emails with no warrant.215
In 2008, Warshak went to trial with several others on a 112-count
indictment for the fraudulent activities of the company. Warshak was
convicted of most counts and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment, and
fines and forfeitures of more than half a million dollars.216 The
government used many of Warshak’s own documents, including his
emails, but did not use any privileged material.217 During the trial,
Warshak’s motion to exclude the emails was denied.218 The Sixth
Circuit had found a privacy interest in the emails before the trial, but the
opinion was vacated for being unripe.219 After the trial ended, Warshak
again appealed the government’s warrantless seizure of his emails to the
Sixth Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion is thoughtful and aware of its novel
precedent, written by the scholarly and thoughtful Justice Boggs.220 The
Sixth Circuit used broad strokes in an overview of general Fourth
Amendment principles, with no real precedent in this area. It started
with a Katz inquiry as to whether Warshak had an expectation of privacy
in his email and whether that expectation was reasonable.221 The court
found that Warshak “plainly manifested an expectation that his emails
would be shielded from outside scrutiny” based on their content.222 The
court found the emails were “often sensitive and sometimes
damning.”223 The court found this expectation on the content alone, and
did not consider any technological protections for this expectation. The
court did not even mention, for example, password protections on the
account.
214. Warshak, 490 F.3d at 460; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (“A court order for disclosure under
subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue
only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”).
215. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 282.
216. Id. at 281–82.
217. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee United States, United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (2010)
Nos. 08-3997, 08-4085, 08-4087, 08-4212, 08-4429, 09-3176, 2009 WL 3392997, at *33–34.
218. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 281.
219. Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008).
220. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 274. The case had two briefs by amici. Brief for Professors of
Electronic Privacy Law and Internet Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, United States v.
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (2010) (No. 06-4092), 2006 WL 4670944 [hereinafter Brief for Professors];
Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al as Amici Curiae Supporting the Appellee, United States v.
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (2010) (No. 06-4092), 2006 WL 4670945.
221. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285.
222. Id. at 284.
223. Id.
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For the second prong of the Katz inquiry, the court was forced to
decide whether society would find a privacy interest in email as
reasonable. The court was well aware of the impact of this decision,
calling it “of grave import and enduring consequence, given the
prominent role that email has assumed in modern communication.”224
The court starts by noting that the Fourth Amendment must keep pace
with technology and that surveillance through technology requires
Fourth Amendment safeguards.
The court analogized email to both phone conversations and sealed
letters, both with well-established reasonable expectations of privacy.225
The court finds similar sensitive communication, similar technological
risk, and historically found that the email search is protected by the
Fourth Amendment.226 Though the court found the search was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, it did not exclude the evidence
because agents relied on ECPA’s statutory authorization for a
warrantless search in good faith.227
The court distinguished Warshak’s emails from Miller based on their
content. Unlike in Miller’s banking requests, in the ordinary course of
business, Warshak sent “confidential” communications.228 The court
also explained that NuVox was the “intermediary, not the intended
recipient of the emails.”229 In this case, NuVox provided Warshak’s
Internet connection as well as his email address,230 as opposed to an ISP
which only provides Internet access. Both Warshak’s and Nuvox’s
actions made NuVox more of an intermediary than an endpoint. If
Warshak had not deleted mail from the server, or if NuVox had always
preserved emails, NuVox would have been a storage facility for
Warshak. In either situation, labeling the provider as simply an
intermediary would have been more challenging.
The court used strong quotes from other sources about recognizing
privacy in email: recognizing the desire to “eliminate the strangely
disparate treatment of mailed and telephonic communications on the one
hand and electronic communications on the other”; that “a search of [an
individual’s] personal e-mail account” would be just as intrusive as “a
wiretap on his home phone line”; and that “[t]he privacy interests in
224. Id.
225. Id. at 285–87.
226. Id. at 287–88.
227. Id. at 292.
228. Id. at 288.
229. Id. (citing Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 200, at 165 (“[W]e view the best analogy for this
scenario as the cases in which a third party carries, transports, or stores property for another. In those
cases, as in the stored e-mail case, the customer grants access to the ISP because it is essential to the
customer’s interests.”)).
230. Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 460 (6th Cir. 2007).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss2/7

36

Bolin: Risky Mail: Concerns in Confidential Attorney-Client Email

2012]

RISKY MAIL

637

[mail and e-mail] are identical.”231 The opinion, however, was
significantly tempered.
The court was forced to address NuVox’s policies, which stated that
“NuVox may access and use individual Subscriber information in the
operation of the Service and as necessary to protect the Service.”232 The
court also noted Nuvox’s practice that it did not keep copies of emails
once downloaded onto account-holders’ computers.233 The court
avoided Hricik’s Federal Express analogy altogether and instead
compared this to the policy of a hotel. Even though staff often enter
hotel rooms, and have the ability to enter a room, guests have a
reasonable expectation of privacy.234 The court found that “some degree
of routine access is hardly dispositive.”235
The court found that Warshak was protected by NuVox’s policies that
it would access emails only under limited circumstances.236
Recognizing the importance of NuVox’s policy to the expectation of
privacy, the court stated, “[W]e are unwilling to hold that a subscriber
agreement will never be broad enough to snuff out a reasonable
expectation of privacy.”237 The court cited to a decision in which an
employee had no right of privacy in files on his office computer, and
another in which a university had much less restrictive privacy policy.238
An intention by an ISP to “audit, inspect, and monitor” might negate a
user’s expectation.239 Thus, the court engaged in a subtle, case-specific
inquiry, suggesting that the privacy policy is critical to this distinction.
Of course, the court here is speaking about a reasonable expectation
of privacy from government searches and from the government
compelling the ISP to turn over information, not from the ISP itself.
The court cited experts in the field, Professors Patricia Bellia and Susan
Freiwald, concerning the role of the ISP as intermediary in this
transaction. They compare the ISP to a case in which “a third party
carries, transports, or stores property for another.”240 This is satisfying
in the context of warrantless government searches, but perhaps not for
231. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 286 (citing Bellia & Friewald, supra note 200, at 135; City of Ontario
v. Quon, 130 S.Ct 2619, 2631 (2010); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008)).
232. Id. at 287.
233. Id. at 287 n.16.
234. Id. at 286–87.
235. Id. at 287.
236. Id.
237. Id. (emphasis omitted).
238. Id. (citing Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 472–73 (6th Cir. 2007)).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 288 (citing Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 200, at 165). Professors Bellia and Freiwald
also argued in the professors’ amicus brief before the court. See Brief for Professors of Electronic
Privacy Law and Internet Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, United States v. Warshak, 631
F.3d 266 (2010) No. 06-4092, 2006 WL 4670944.
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confidentiality. In the Article cited by the court, Bellia and Freiwald
continue and explain the expectation of privacy with respect to the ISP
itself:
To be clear, users may lack a reasonable expectation of privacy with
regard to those third party intermediaries who discover information in the
course of exercising their rightful access to the users’ packages, storage
lockers, rental properties, or stored e-mail accounts. That implies that if
the third party chooses to disclose the information so discovered to the
government without requiring a warrant, the user cannot complain. When
the user assumed the risk that the intermediary would discover
incriminating information or property in the course of its business, she
also assumed the risk that the intermediary would choose to turn that
information over to the government. If the user mistakenly trusted the
intermediary to protect its incriminating information, there is no reason
for the Fourth Amendment to protect that misplaced trust.241

This grave warning, from the stalwart defenders of email privacy,
shows that ISPs are the weakest link in email privacy. Bellia and
Freiwald suggest a service provider less protective than NuVox which
may turn over information without being compelled by the government.
This brings to mind the long line of cases in which criminals mistrusted
third parties who then turned over communications to the
government.242 Service providers may also be that unreliable third party
which turns over information to law enforcement. Bellia and Freiwald’s
article suggest that a cooperative ISP would have the right to voluntarily
turn over information, at least under the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, but the government would still need to obtain a warrant to
compel disclosure.
In their brief to the court, professor amici, including Bellia and
Freiwald, argued:
Terms of service set forth the ways in which a service provider may need
to protect its system and business from fraud, hacking, unauthorized use,
and the like. Whatever rights the service provider might have to access
communications to perform those functions, those rights do not give the
service provider the right to disclose communications for the
fundamentally different purpose of assisting law enforcement
investigations of unrelated crimes . . . .
Notwithstanding its terms of service, a service provider’s right to protect
its own property does not release the Government from the constraints of
the Constitution. Any third party that holds property on behalf of
241. Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 200, at 166–67.
242. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (holding government agent can reveal
contents of conversations); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (holding incriminating
statements to an informant required misplaced confidence in the informant).
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another, such as a storage company, may retain the right to inspect units
to prevent damage that might occur to its property or that of other
customers. The fact that the storage company has or exercises such a
right, however, says nothing about the relationship between the storage
customer and government agents.243

Though these policies were not at issue in these cases, providers often
do have such provisions, allowing ISPs to voluntarily disclose under
certain conditions to third parties, including the government. Service
provider policies usually explicate reasons ISPs can disclose
communications, including criminal activity or emergencies, in part to
be able to comply with mandatory reporting laws.244 Service providers
are required by law, for example, to report known child pornography,
and are subject to fines for failure to do so.245 In this case, NuVox did
not invoke such a provision, but ISP policies regularly allow for
disclosure to others in certain situations.246
Because NuVox did not assert it, the brief did not consider whether
violation of terms of service, such as committing a crime through
NuVox’s service, would forfeit Warshak’s right of privacy with respect
to both the ISP and the government.247 This broader issue, though not at
issue in this case, could have widespread consequences for Fourth
Amendment law and in confidentiality.
Bellia and Freiwald’s general deference to ISP policies regarding
privacy is consistent with recognizing ISP rights, established by policies
and contracts. The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Warshak can only be
compatible with the line of cases establishing employer’s rights if the
user can waive his rights by agreeing to the policy. The distinction
between NuVox, which resisted accessing and disclosing
communications, and an employer, who intentionally stored and used
communications adversely, is the provider’s policies.
In the context of confidentiality, Warshak may offer false reassurance
for attorneys, as the landmark case offering a headline-worthy
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in email, just as Professor Hrick’s
1998 article did. Comment 17 to Model Rule 1.6 allows attorneys to
communicate with no security precautions if the medium “offers a

243. Brief for Professors, supra note 220, at 8.
244. Even in 1997, AOL allowed disclosure “to comply with applicable law” and “in emergencies
when AOL, Inc. believe[d] that physical safety [wa]s at risk.” AOL, REVISED AMERICA ONLINE
PRIVACY POLICY (1997), available at http://epic.org/privacy/consumer/aol_revised_policy.html.
245. 18 U.S.C. § 2258A (2008).
246. NuVox’s current Privacy Policy does contain a term that they may disclose information “to
identify, contact, or bring legal action against someone who may be violating our Acceptable Use
Policy.” NUVOX, NUVOX’S PRIVACY POLICY, available at http://home.nuvox.net/privacy.html.
247. Brief for Professors, supra note 220, at 8 n.12.
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reasonable expectation of privacy.”248 At least for the Sixth Circuit,
Warshak’s Fourth Amendment holding shows a reasonable expectation
of privacy from the government alone, not third party ISPs. ISP access,
as a private party, does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.
Confidentiality is concerned with more than just government access;
attorneys must consider access by non-governmental third parties,
including ISPs. For an expectation of privacy from ISPs, users must
consult their policies.
B. Read Your Privacy Policy Lately?
Perhaps the persistent elephant in the room in the court opinions, bar
association opinions, academic discussion, or any discussion about
email privacy at all is the case-specific inquiry of the provider’s
policies: user agreements, terms of service, usage policies, and privacy
policies.249 Even if there might be an expectation of privacy, that
expectation can be contracted away by the user. In all cases, reasonable
expectation of privacy will depend on the provider’s policies.
Professor Hricik believed users can rely on the privacy of their email
by contract and that attorneys should inspect the privacy policy of their
service provider.250 This policy should set some rights to mail which
Hricick assumes will further protect users’ privacy, relying on the thenrobust AOL privacy policy. Professor Hricik treated his email, while
waiting to be downloaded to its final resting place at his computer, as
property in bailment, subject to a contract.251 The ABA agreed, citing
ISP policies as a key factor in maintaining privacy within a network,
limiting even legal access, without citing a single privacy policy.252
This assumption about privacy policies is obsolete, as acknowledged by
the ABA in 2011.

248. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 17 (2009).
249. Mike McNerney, Warshak: A Test Case for the Intersection of Law Enforcement and Cyber
Security, 2010 U. ILL. J. L. TECH & POL’Y 345, 351 (2010) (“Practically speaking, adjudicating cases
such as these on a case-by-case basis isn’t very satisfying. Outside of basic subscriber information, it
seems hard to believe that the Fourth Amendment should only apply in so far as an ISP user
agreement.”).
250. Hricik & Fallingham, supra note 6, at 282–83.
251. Hricik, supra note 4, at 490 (“Assuming the provider is according e-mail content reasonable
security from its own employees, e-mail should be deemed to be secure because it is similar to files
stored at an off-site storage facility.”).
252. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) (“The denial of
external access ordinarily is ensured by the use of password-protected mailboxes or encryption. The
threat to confidentiality caused by the potential inspection of users’ e-mail by OSP system
administrators who must access the e-mail for administrative and compliance purposes is overcome by
the adoption of a formal policy that narrowly restricts the bases on which system administrators and
OSP agents are permitted to examine user e-mail.”).
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Privacy policies are now longer, meaner, and more vague since
Hricik’s articles. The assumed privacy protections are now hazy or even
hostile to privacy interests, and the assumed practices to keep email
confidential will obviously depend on the privacy policy. Today’s user
should be very concerned about the case-specific policies relating to
email. Privacy policies, such as employer policies discussed above, may
offer no privacy at all.
Professor Hricik confidently relied on the AOL Privacy Policy, as an
example of a service provider dedicated to privacy. This policy has
been updated several times in the past years, always acting retroactively.
In 1997, AOL’s privacy policy promised to delete mail within twentyfive to thirty days, and explicitly promised confidentiality.253 While that
1997 privacy policy is reassuring, the 2012 AOL privacy policy is
hazier, and much, much longer. It states, in part:
The contents of your online communications, as well as other information
about you as an AOL Network user, may be accessed and disclosed in
response: to lawful governmental requests or legal process (for example,
a court order, search warrant or subpoena), in other circumstances in
which AOL has a good faith belief that a crime has been or is being
committed by an AOL user, that an emergency exists that poses a threat
to the safety of you or another person, when necessary either to protect
the rights or property of AOL, or for us to render the service you have
requested.254

AOL, like all providers, can also monitor for violation of the Terms of
Service:
To prevent violations and enforce this TOS and remediate any violations,
we can take any technical, legal, and other actions that we deem, in our
sole discretion, necessary and appropriate without notice to you.

The AOL Terms of Service require users to comply with many vague
requirements, including “[c]omply with applicable laws and regulations
and not participate in, facilitate, or further illegal activities” and not use
sexually explicit speech.255 AOL maintains its general focus on user

253. Hricik, supra note 4, at 489.
254. AOL Privacy Policy, AOL (Sept. 7, 2012, 10:51 AM), http://privacy.aol.com/privacy-policy/.
255. Terms of Service, AOL (Sept 7, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://legal.aol.com/terms-of-service/fullterms (“To use our Services, you must: a. Comply with applicable laws and regulations and not
participate in, facilitate, or further illegal activities; b. Immediately notify us if you learn of a security
breach or other illegal activity on the Services; c. Protect your username and password; d. Not post
content that contains explicit or graphic descriptions or accounts of sexual acts or is threatening,
abusive, harassing, defamatory, libelous, deceptive, fraudulent, invasive of another’s privacy, or
tortious; e. Not engage in an activity that is harmful to us or our customers, advertisers, affiliates,
vendors, or anyone else; f. Not use any automated process to access or use the Services or any process,
whether automated or manual, to capture data or content from any Service for any reason; and g. Not
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privacy and limits access and disclosure to business purposes, legal
processes, and issues such as furtherance of crime or an emergency. Of
course, this dedication to the mail’s privacy assumes the mail complies
with the terms of service.
The issue of whether a user forfeits an expectation of privacy when he
violates terms of service is unclear.256 Certainly, an employee violating
a policy of no personal use is considered in cases involving personal use
of employer mail.257 AOL does not describe violation of terms of
service as an enumerated category subject to disclosure, but AOL does
reserve the right to “any technical, legal, and other actions” for
violations of terms of service.258 Whereas the previous policy was black
and white, the new AOL policy is tinged with gray.
ISPs may offer no privacy at all. Beyond employer networks, there
are many large networks in which users may contract away their
expectation of privacy. Public sector emails are subject to become
public documents, as we all have seen with constant, high-profile
disclosures of inappropriate emails as public documents. In 2007, D.
Kyle Sampson, then chief of staff for Attorney General Alberto
Gonzalez, resigned after emails became public showing plans to remove
certain U.S. Attorneys.259 Harris County, Texas District Attorney Chuck
Rosenthal also resigned when his emails showed an improper
relationships and racially derogatory content.260
Emails held by public entities, including public universities, are at
risk to become public documents under open records and freedom of
information laws.261
These laws generally exempt privileged
information, but not the broader category of confidential information.
Further, the entity reviewing for exceptions may not have the same
interests as the communicating parties. Thus, when a public entity,
including a university or law clinic, discloses documents, its privilege
review can be very challenging, based on the reviewer’s attorney status
and relationship to the attorney–client communications.262
use any Service or any process to damage, disable, impair, or otherwise attack our Services or the
networks connected to the Services.”).
256. The amici brief in Warshak did not address this issue. Brief for Professors, supra note 220,
at 8 n.12.
257. See Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. Inc. 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 439–40 (Sup. Ct. 2007).
258. Terms of Service, supra note 255.
259. Joshua Poje, Sanctions Just a Click Away: Email’s Ethical Pitfalls, 7 PUB. SERVANT 1, 5
(2009).
260. Id.
261. See Gregory C. Sisk & Nicholas Halbur, A Ticking Time Bomb? University Data Privacy
Policies and Attorney–Client Confidentiality in Law School Settings, UTAH L. REV. 1277, 1305 (2010).
262. Id. at 1305, n.114. Privilege may be also able to override a clearly written privacy policy
when the work is internal, serving the public entity itself. In City of Reno, a city labor relations
employee authorized a memorandum emailed to the chief deputy city attorney, two deputy city
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Public university legal clinics have a uniquely difficult burden with
freedom of information laws. Rutgers School of Law, a public New
Jersey university, recently challenged its responsibilities under the New
Jersey Open Public Records Act.263 Rutgers argued that the disclosures
would put the clinics at a disadvantage, compared to private legal
services, because their files may be subject to disclosure.264 In 2010, a
New Jersey Court found the law applied to the Rutgers legal clinic as to
any other state-funded program, as written, with the “specifically
delineated twenty-one exemptions.”265 The New Jersey law provides
exemptions for information that must be produced, including attorney–
client privilege, and specific types of information, such as social security
numbers and driver’s license numbers.266 These exceptions would likely
not apply to many documents actually requested in the case: time
records for attorneys and staff, payment records, minutes of meetings,
and broad categories of documents.267 Public disclosures, such as those
required in New Jersey, can be troubling for attorneys’ ethical standards
and for maintaining client confidence. Professor Gregory Sisk claims
these disclosures “would likely prevent clinics at a public university
form continuing to represent clients.”268 Rutgers’ Acceptable Use
Policy was amended after the decision to add a privacy exception for
information subject to the New Jersey Open Public Records Act.269
In 2010, Professor Gregory Sisk and Nicolas Halbur published a
thoughtful discussion of university privacy policies within the context of
clinical work by law school faculty members.270 They found that
universities often have counterintuitive policies, restrictive for
institutions thought to encourage a protected space for free thought and
speech.271 Most universities provide some privacy for users, requiring
exigency or some judgment call to prompt inspection of a user’s
information.272 However, a “significant minority . . . begin from the
attorneys, and an assistant city manager. The privacy policy stated that city employees had “no
expectation of privacy” and that email “may be classified as public documents.” In this case, the Court
found the email memorandum confidential, and thus privileged, despite the privacy policy. City of
Reno v. Reno Police Protective Ass’n, 59 P. 3d 1212, 1218–19 (Nev. 2002).
263. Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers, 6 A.3d 983 (N.J. 2010).
264. Id. at 989–90.
265. Id. at 993.
266. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1.1 (2005).
267. Rutgers, 6 A.3d at 986–87.
268. Sisk & Halbur, supra note 261, at n.114.
269. Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, Acceptable Use Policy for Computing and
Information Technology Resources, at C(2) (2010), http://policies.rutgers.edu/PDF/Section70/70.1.1current.pdf.
270. Sisk & Halbur, supra note 261, at 1278.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1295–96.
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stated premise that users of computer systems are not guaranteed or
should not expect privacy.”273
This departure from traditional
expectations in email, or even as compared to commercial email service
providers, is critical.
Kansas State University’s privacy policy states that all users,
including employees and students, have “no expectation of privacy” in
anything on the university network.274 Villanova School of Law, a
private school, agrees, stating, “[w]hile the Law School attempts to keep
email messages secure, privacy is not guaranteed and users should have
no general expectation of privacy in email messages sent through the
Law School system.”275 These policies are problematic for attorney’s
expectation of privacy and contradict the basic principles of a
university’s unique setting, valuing privacy and academic freedom.276
An attorney inspecting these terms of service should be cautious
about sending sensitive information, encrypted or not, to a network with
no reasonable expectation of privacy. These network owners, like
employer–owners of private networks providing email to employees,
could not be more clear about the terms of their proprietary networks,
and there is no room to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy with
such a clear policy explaining otherwise. These policies are a grave risk
for a client’s private information as well as an attorney’s reputation and
ethical standards.
The Villanova School of Law policy mirrors the less private
undergraduate policy, attached to Villanova’s assignment of universityaffiliated Gmail accounts, which appear to be from @villanova.edu, but
are served in part by Google.277 “While the University will make every
attempt to keep email messages secure, privacy is not guaranteed and
users should have no general expectation of privacy in email messages
sent through a University Email Account or through a Gmail
Account.”278 Villanova University is an early adopter of Google’s
“Google Apps,” which includes cloud based services targeted at
273. Id. at 1296.
274. Kansas State University, Electronic Mail Policy, in POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL
Ch. 3455 § .020 (2010), available at http://www.k-state.edu/policies/ppm/3455.html (“To the greatest
extent possible in a public setting individuals’ privacy should be preserved. However, there is no
expectation of privacy or confidentiality for documents and messages stored on University-owned
equipment.”).
275. Web and Email Policies, VILLANOVA UNIV. SCH. OF LAW (Sept. 7, 2012, 12:09 PM),Email,
http://www.law.villanova.edu/current%20students/technology%20services/web%20and%20email%20p
olicies.aspx.
276. Sisk & Halbur, supra note 261, at 1301.
277. Villanova
Gmail,
VILLANOVA
UNIV.
(Sept.
7,
2012
12:14
PM),
http://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/unit/accounts/email/vugmail.html.
UNIV.
(Sept.
7,
2012,
12:16
PM),
278. Email
Policy,
VILLANOVA
http://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/unit/about/policies/emailpolicy.html.
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universities.279 In this case, Villanova’s privacy policy clearly conflicts
with Google’s generally privacy-focused policies, though carrying
Google’s branding. In such a case, users need to be aware of their
overlapping and possibly conflicting privacy policies, which may
require investigation.
Others, such as University of North Carolina, may appear to hold the
same intent, but more vaguely. “There is no guarantee of privacy or
confidentiality for data stored or for messages stored or sent on
University-owned equipment.”280 This “no guarantee” could be a
statement about technical vulnerability; we all know that nothing is
guaranteed in technology. However, this acceptance of limited rights
may also be considered a waiver. An attorney should carefully consider
staking his professional ethics on such vague policies.
Most university policies contain exceptions that allow university
administrators, such a provost or a vice president, the ability to inspect
emails.281 Yale’s policy allows access with approval by the provost and
appropriate dean for faculty, or the appropriate dean for students.282
Professor Hricik’s current institution, Mercer University, allows even
more access:
[S]ystems support staff, systems operators, supervisors, and designated
University officials may access information resources to locate and
protect business information, maintain system and network resources,
ensure system and network security, provide technical support, comply
with legal requirements, or administer Mercer University policies.283

Many universities have similar policies that allow high-ranking, nonattorney administrator access, with or without some form of cause.284
In the context of attorney–client email, non-lawyer access is
problematic for confidentiality as well as for an attorney’s ethics
obligations under Model Rule 5.3, which requires attorneys to supervise
all non-attorney access.285 Attorneys have an ethical duty to make sure
their systems staff are appropriately trained to maintain confidences and
appropriately bound to keep those confidences.286 These university
279. See
E-Mail,
VILLANOVA
UNIV.
(Sept.
7,
2012,
12:17
PM),
http://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/unit/accounts/email.html.
280. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Policy on the Privacy of Electronic Information,
in POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (2002), available at http://www.unc.edu/campus/policies/elec_info.html.
281. Sisk & Halbur, supra note 261, at 1297–98.
282. YALE UNIV. POLICY 1607 (Yale Univ. 2011).
283. Information Technology Access and Use Policy, in POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL
(Mercer Univ. 2004).
284. See Sisk & Halbur, supra note 261, at 1302–04.
285. See id. at 1303–04.
286. Id. at 1307; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-398
(1995).
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terms allow a stranger to the attorney–client relationship access to
privileged material, without the required attorney supervision.287
This relationship is challenging, because although the university
appears to be a private, secure network, it is not subject to the same
security and confidentiality risks that attorneys must consider when
establishing networks handling confidential information.288 Unlike
users of the law firm’s network, the university does not have a common
relationship to the clients. Instead, the information is at risk by an
authorized, unrelated party with no relationship whatsoever to the
attorney–client relationship. Well-crafted university policies would
require, at a minimum, a review for privileged information by an
attorney with no conflict of interest.289
Students also have a problematic relationship with their university
privacy policies. In Reichert v. Elizabethtown College, a Pennsylvania
district court easily reached the conclusion that a university’s inspection
of a student’s email in the context of an expulsion dispute was not a
violation of privacy, ECPA, SCA, or state wiretap laws.290 The court
did not even examine the college’s privacy policy, as the student’s email
was provided by the college.291 This court treated the student much
more like an employee than a paying customer.
Even for providers generally focused on privacy, it is important for
attorneys to read the terms. Gmail’s recently revised Google Privacy
Policy adds changes an attorney should consider:
We may use collect information about the services that you use and how
you use them, like when you visit a website that uses our advertising
services . . . .
We may share aggregated non-personally identifiable information
publicly and with our partners.
We will share personal information with companies, organizations or
individuals outside of Google if we have a good-faith belief that access,
use, preservation or disclosure of the information is reasonably necessary
to . . . protect against harm to the rights, property, or safety of Google,
our users or the public as required or permitted by live . . . Google
processes personal information on our servers in many countries and
around the world. We may process your personal information on a server
located outside the country where you live.292

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Sisk & Halbur, supra note 261, at 1304.
Id. at 1303–05.
Id.
Reichert v. Elizabethtown Coll., No. 10-2248, 2011 WL 3438318 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2011).
Id. at *4–5.
Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (Sept. 7, 2012, 1:28 PM), http://www.google.com/privacy.html.
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This Privacy Policy is upfront and clear, and shows Google’s dedication
to privacy in most circumstances, but it adds another wrinkle: explicit
acknowledgement that confidential information might be leaving the
country where another jurisdiction’s laws apply.
Google’s transparency is refreshing compared to general silence
about the location of user data, but should raise questions about other
providers’ terms for storage and for processing private information. As
off-site storage, or “cloud computing” increases, these jurisdictional
issues will become more pervasive and thus more important for
attorneys to consider. Other services may store information offshore as
well, but may not even notify users. Many users, and thus their
attorneys, may be completely ignorant of where their data is being
stored. Villanova’s Gmail-serviced accounts may be on servers in
Pennsylvania, they may be on Google servers in California, or they may
be somewhere else completely. Privilege is a location-specific inquiry,
often dependent on state-specific standards of confidentiality and ethics,
and the location of this information could be critical, especially with
providers less focused on privacy than Google.
Other privacy policies have a host of terms that may or may not
support a finding of privacy once a user has violated the terms. These
policies can contain all sorts of terms. For example, Yale requires users
to decrypt encrypted messages on request and staff must have approval
to send any encrypted mail.293 Yale prohibits everything from “chain
letters” to “reckless distribution of unwanted mail” to “harassing or
threatening uses” as violations of the network’s terms.294
AOL and Google attempt to be straightforward and transparent about
their policies. However, other providers’ policies can be flung across
several documents. Yale has over a dozen documents on the main
“Policies, Procedures, and Guidance” page for all kinds of technology
policies as well as unlinked, isolated documents, such as Procedure 1607
PR.01, which contains specific technical guidelines to allow Yale to
decrypt all encrypted mail.295 Simply finding a provider’s complete
policies could be quite an endeavor, if possible at all.
Just these few examples of privacy policies raise serious questions
about what kind of expectations are reasonable for users. Attorneys
should look for clear explanations of when the ISP can access
information itself, and when it can disclose it to others. It may be
unreasonable for some users to have any expectation of privacy at all, or
to be able to understand the terms at all. The ABA draws great comfort
293. Endorsed Encryption Implementation Procedure, in YALE UNIVERSITY POLICY 1607 PR.01
(Yale Univ. 2010) [hereinafter Encryption].
294. YALE UNIV. POLICY, supra note 282.
295. Encryption, supra note 293.
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from privacy policies, which could protect messages, but could just as
easily contract away privacy.
C. The Enron Problem—Discovery & Disclosure
Attorneys sending information to third party servers just don’t know
where they will end up. Hackers aside, there are many venues for legal
disclosure at the hands of a third party. The Federal Energy Resource
Commission (FERC) confiscated Enron’s Microsoft Outlook database
as part of its investigation into Enron’s illegal activities. It then took an
unprecedented step to comply with its FOIA responsibilities. On March
23, 2003, the FERC published 1.6 million emails, calendar entries, and
tasks, sent to and by 176 former and current Enron executives and
employees.296 Importantly, not everyone in the corpus was an Enron
employee, such as Kenneth Lay’s daughter Elizabeth, or Enron’s outside
counsel. These senders lost privacy interests by sending to Enron’s
network.
The set of data, later known as “The Enron Corpus,” was originally
released in full, until unwitting participants objected to releasing private
mail.297 The corpus was taken offline, and FERC used filters for terms
like divorce or social security numbers, removing parts of the corpus
assumed to be the most private mail, though not necessarily the most
embarrassing.298 FERC claimed to respond to claims of privacy and
privilege in subsequent redaction of thousands of emails, now missing
from the final version and not used when analyzing the data.299
The Enron Corpus, freely available at the FERC website,300 still
contains email to in-house counsel and outside attorneys, many with
their sad disclaimers uselessly attached from Vinson & Elkins,301
296. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATION COMMISSION,FINAL REPORT ON PRICE MANIPULATION IN
WESTERN MARKETS (2003).
297. See generally InBoxer Case Study of Enron Email Reveals Email Liability Remains a
Significant Risk; Audiotreive CEO Roger Matus Presents ‘Monsters in Your Mailbox’ at Inbox East
2004
Conference,
BUSINESS
WIRE,
Nov.
17,
2004,
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20041117005035/en/InBoxer-Case-Study-Enron-EmailReveals-Email.
298. See generally E-mails Can Pose Risks to Big Corporations, ECON. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004,
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2004-11-21/news/27380997_1_e-mails-roger-matusenron-corp; The Enron E-mail Corpus, SGI (Sept. 7, 2012, 2:53 PM), http://sgi.nu/enron/index.php.
299. Interview with Mark Hershfield, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Apr. 4, 2006.
300. Information Released in Enron Investigation, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wec/enron/info-release.asp.
301. Id. (browse to Enron Corpus website; follow “Enron E-mail” hyperlink; select “Enron Email” and then click the “Open” button) (“CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE . . . The information in this
e-mail may be confidential and/or privileged. This e-mail is intended to be reviewed by only the
individual or organization named above. If you are not the intended recipient or an authorized
representative of the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, dissemination or

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss2/7

48

Bolin: Risky Mail: Concerns in Confidential Attorney-Client Email

2012]

RISKY MAIL

649

Skadden Arps,302 and international firms.303 The redacted version of the
Enron Corpus contains the word 35,621 uses of the word confidential,304
This very public email release shows that lawyers simply don’t know
where email will end up. For Enron’s outside counsel, their confidential
email ended up next to Elizabeth Lay’s embarrassing comments about
weddings, crunched by spam software vendors, pawed through by
journalists and gawkers worldwide, and run in academic computer labs
from Berkeley to MIT for projects from mail pattern visualization to
social networking.305 The Enron Corpus is an extreme example of
compromised privacy, but legally, it is absolutely sound, a choice in the
discretion of the investigating agency dealing with now-public
documents.
Email will be critical in other kinds of investigations, and documents
containing every aspect of personal and professional lives existing on a
mail server could be turned over.306 Future corpuses could be disclosed
in many other contexts, such as the White House’s voluntary release of
Solyndra emails from inside and outside the White House.307 Sarbanes–
Oxley requires retention of many kinds of documents for public

copying of this e-mail and its attachments, if any, or the information contained herein is prohibited. If
you have received this e-mail in error, please immediately notify the sender by return e-mail and delete
this e-mail from your system. Thank You.”).
302. Id. (“This e-mail, and any attachments thereto, is intended only for use by the addressee(s)
named herein and may contain legally privileged and/or confidential information. If you are not the
intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying
of this e-mail, and any attachments thereto, is strictly prohibited. If you have received this e-mail in
error, please immediately notify me at (212) 735-3000 and permanently delete the original and any copy
of any e-mail and any printout thereof. Further information about the firm, a list of the Partners and
their professional qualifications will be provided upon request.”).
303. Id. (“This e-mail is sent by or on behalf of Linklaters, 10/F Alexandra House, Chater Road,
Hong Kong. A list of the firm’s principals will be provided to the recipient(s) of this e-mail upon
request. This statement is made in compliance with the Law Society of Hong Kong’s Practice Direction
on the Format of Electronic Communications. This message is confidential. It may also be privileged
or otherwise protected by work product immunity or other legal rules. If you have received it by
mistake please let us know by reply and then delete it from your system; you should not copy the
message or disclose its contents to anyone.”).
304. Neil Cooke et al., IP Protection: Detecting Email Based Breaches of Confidence, in IEEE
THIRD INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INFORMATION ASSURANCE AND SECURITY (2007).
305. Ryan Singel, Science Puts Enron E-Mail to Use, WIRED NEWS Jan. 30, 2006,
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/01/70100?currentPage=all.
306. Seward, supra note 1, at 44 (“Prof. Arthur R. Miller of Harvard was quoted as saying:
‘Today, as computers document almost every aspect of our clients’ professional and personal lives,
electronic discovery becomes essential in every type of legal case.’ Miller, a pioneer of early cyber law,
made that observation several years ago, and indeed the reality of that statement shall be felt on Dec. 1,
2006, when the new proposed changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) on electronic
discovery become law.”).
307. See Neela Banerjee & Matea Gold, Obama Fundraiser Took Active Interest in Solyndra
Loan, E-mails Show, L.A. TIMES Oct. 8, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/08/business/la-fisolyndra-white-house-20111008.
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companies, including emails for long periods of time.308 Attorneys must
request that documents produced to the SEC in an SEC investigation be
treated as confidential, or the emails are also subject to FOIA
requests.309 A third party responding to such an inquiry may not even
know the material is privileged, or care to spend resources defending
privilege in an unrelated matter because an unrelated attorney was
careless about the destination of his mail.
Email on third-party servers is also at risk for disclosure in unrelated
civil matters,310 as the ABA warned in 2011.311 After December 2006,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expanded electronic discovery.
The amendments changed Rule 26(b)(2)(B)–(c) for electronic discovery
requests.312 All “reasonably accessible” data must be provided absent a
showing of “good cause.”313 If privileged information is on a third-party
server, that third-party, with no duty to the attorney or the client, may be
more concerned about its production requirement than potential
privilege in an unrelated case. When the information is on a third-party
server, it may be impossible for an attorney to defend confidential or
privileged information.
Disclosure of unrelated material, or a
“document dump,” may even be strategic.314
This scenario is
problematic for privacy and for privilege, especially given jurisdictional
and case-by-case interpretations of waiver.
When email is on a third-party server, both sender and recipient risk
disclosure of confidential information and privilege waiver through
unrelated disclosure. When the entire server is released, the confidential
material is in another’s hands or even on the official record, like the
Enron Corpus.
IV. FINDING SOLUTIONS
“[I]t is not asking too much to insist that if a client wishes to preserve
the privilege . . . he must take some affirmative steps to preserve

308. Wiliam R. Baker III & Michele D. Johnson, Defending a Broker Dealer in SEC
Investigations after Dodd–Frank, 1914 PLI CORP. 1019, 1038–39 (2011).
309. Id. at 1040.
310. Jonathan Rose, Note, E-Mail Security Risks: Taking Hacks at the Attorney Client Privilege,
23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 179, 205 (1997).
311. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011) (“[O]ther third
parties may be able to obtain access to an employee’s electronic communications by issuing a subpoena
to the employer.”).
312. Daniel B. Garrie et al., Hiding the Inaccessible Truth: Amending the Federal Rules to
Accommodate Electronic Discovery, 25 REV. LITIG. 115 (2006).
313. Id.
314. Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Data Dumps: The Bane of E-Discovery, 71 OR. ST. B.
BULL 36, 36 (2011).
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confidentiality.”315 Every ethics opinion, court case, and academic
recognizes that an attorney must use his judgment, and that there are
situations when an attorney needs to use caution. Technology-based
solutions may be the best practice available and part of reasonable
measures to preserve confidentiality.
A. Technology-Based Solutions
In networked systems, no one security measure can offer security, and
no network can have perfect security.316 I discuss one method of
technological protection for e-mail, encryption, as only part of a larger
plan of best practices.317 However, all encryption systems can
theoretically be broken or can be implemented incorrectly.318 Thus, I
speak about encryption as a best practice only, not as failsafe protection.
Encryption guards the contents of an email from any third party,
including an intercepting party or a third party accessing the stored
messages. Thus, a copy of encrypted email in the hands of a third party,
even a user’s ISP, is useless. Public key cryptography uses pairs of
keys, with one widely distributed “public key” that is not secret and
corresponding “private key” that only its owner holds.319 Users can use
the public key to send messages that only the private key can read, and
the private key sends messages that only the private key owner can send.
Users can exchange their public keys and transmit using public keys in
otherwise insecure environments, but use private keys to decrypt.320
Email encryption on a mail client can be more difficult to use
than, say, a secure webpage. In 1999, a study evaluated naïve users’ use
of a new email encryption system for Macintosh computers.321 Of the
twelve participants, four were able to send properly sealed mail, and

315. In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1973).
316. TANSU ALPCAN & TAMER BAŞAR, NETWORK SECURITY: A DECISION AND GAMERTHEORETIC APPROACH 6–7 (2011) (“Networks are man-made systems. Since the system engineersare
human beings who make mistakes, future networks will have vulnerabilities in some form, no matter
how carefully they are designed. As long as there are people who would benefit from exploiting
vulnerabilities for selfish reasons, there will always be security threats and attacks.”).
317. For articles on additional security measures, see the thorough technical descriptions in the
articles cited supra Note 8.
318. STEVE BURNETT AND STEPHEN PAYNE, RSA SECURITY’S OFFICIAL GUIDE TO
CRYPTOGRAPHY 13 (2001) (“All crypto can be broken, and, more importantly, if it’s implemented
incorrectly, it adds no real security.”).
319. A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce,
75 OR. L. REV. 49, 51 (1996).
320. Id. at 51–52.
321. Alma Whitten & J.D. Tygar, Why Johnny Can’t Encrpyt: A Usability Evaluation of PGP 5.0¸
in SECURITY AND USABILITY: DESIGNING SECURE SYSTEMS THAT PEOPLE CAN USE (L. Cranor et al.
eds. 2005).
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only one could complete all the tasks the authors consider minimal
encryption procedures.322 This level of failure posed a serious risk to the
entire system, in the authors’ view.323
Since that time, major mail clients have all embedded encryption
support.324 These programs have increased usability with simpler
interfaces, automatic unsealing, and better error messages. Many of the
failures in the study, such as sending a message without the appropriate
keypair, are impossible in many modern applications. In a 2005 study
repeating the 1999 study, most of the fourteen lay participants were able
to use Microsoft Outlook’s encryption features functionally.325
As with all new technologies, lawyers can be trained to adapt. In
part, thanks to HIPAA, encryption solutions for email are now
commercially available for small business networks, and even for
services like Gmail.326 Today, implementing email encryption is not the
barrier it once was.
B. Technology-Based Solutions as Reasonable Measures
Encryption may be a part of best practices for protecting a message
from a third party. Even if encryption is not failsafe, encryption is a
good way for attorneys to use technology to clearly explicate their
expectation of privacy in sensitive data. Encryption may be an actual
barrier to interceptors, legal or otherwise. Encryption is also a clear
label of who is authorized to read a confidential communication.
Common sense tells all attorneys that there is some information that
probably just should not be in email, or some that is sensitive enough to
require special effort. For example, law firms dealing with information
such as pending mergers know to have a “healthy paranoia” about this
highly sensitive information.327 Health professionals and finance
322. Simson L. Garfinkel & Robert C. Miller, Johnny 2: A User Test of Key Continuity
Management With S/MIME and Outlook Express, SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY
22(2005), available at http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2005/program.html (“In our experience, most email users are not aware of the fact that a message can be intentionally and maliciously modified as it
moves through a computer network or waits for delivery on a mail server. Although we did not
specifically ask our users if they realized this possibility, only one (S39) of the users in the study raised
this possibility in either the ‘thinking out loud’ or in the follow-up interviews. That user was so
paralyzed by the notion that a malicious attacker might be modifying the e-mail messages she was
receiving that she was unable to complete the majority of the experiment.”).
323. Whitten & Tygar, supra note 321, at 3 (“It is well known the security of a networked
computer is only as strong as its weakest component. If a cracker can exploit a single error, the game is
up.”).
324. Garfinkel & Miller, supra note 322, at 2.
325. Id. at 11.
326. See, e.g., PENANGO, www.penango.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
327. Michael A. Riley & Sophia Pearson, China-Based Hackers Target Law Firms to Get Secret
Deal Data, BLOOMBERG, Jan 31, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-31/china-based-
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professionals face similar issues with highly confidential information.
Health professionals have a great deal of experience implementing these
systems after health care privacy laws, mainly HIPAA, which, while not
technology-specific, has far greater restrictions than legal standards.328
Common sense also tells attorneys that information in danger of
harmful interception should be protected, whether that interception is
legal or not. “Even if interception is illegal, if it is easy to intercept
messages, the law is of cold comfort to clients and counsel.”329 This
situation might be true for divorce documents accessed on a shared
computer, the public wireless router at the coffee shop, or other
situations where email might be subject to adverse interception, legally
or illegally.
Technical solutions may work. Today’s encryption takes significant
resources to break.330 Technologists predict that in a matter of years,
routine matters may use virtually unbreakable encryption.331 Even if the
law or the privacy policy may not protect your communication,
encryption may. Even a legally authorized snooper may technically fail
at attempts to intercept messages.
Encryption is also a very clear label about expectations of privacy.
Encryption may be insufficient in the Fourth Amendment context to
legally protect in the context of law enforcement decrypting a message
already accessed.332 However, in the context of confidential attorney–
client communications, encryption is a clear message that an attorney
has made efforts to conceal the communication. In the context of
confidentiality, encryption easily analogizes to whispering in a
courtroom hall to prevent others from overhearing the messages. This
effort may be meaningless to a Fourth Amendment inquiry, but does
show efforts to maintain confidentiality between attorney and client.
Like opening a sealed FedEx package, decrypting an encrypted email
requires affirmative action to violate what has been sealed, in spite of its
labels of intended recipients. This action may change the ethical
hackers-target-law-firms.html.
328. Sarah S. Mir, HIPAA Privacy Rule: Maintaining the Confidentiality of Medical Records,
Part 2, 13 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 35 (2011); Bryan Bergeron, MD, Where is HIPAA Taking
Physician Practices?, 7 MEDSCAPE GENERAL MEDICINE 65 (2005).
329. Hricik & Fallingham, supra note 6, at 299.
330. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a “Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy?”, 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 503 (2001) (“Because encryption keys are in most
cases impossible to guess—trying to guess a single key could occupy a supercomputer for millions of
years—encryption offers Internet users a degree of privacy in Internet communications that remains
unequaled in the physical world.”).
331. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 866 (2004).
332. See Kerr, supra note 331, at 513 (“The courts have not yet faced a direct Fourth Amendment
challenge to the decryption of encrypted Internet communications.”).
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requirements for inadvertent communications, and may show that the
mail was not intended for third-party consumption. In ABA Opinion
11-460, the ABA refused to protect unencrypted emails abandoned on
an employer’s system as inadvertent disclosures, but encrypted emails
carry their own clear message about confidentiality. An attorney
encountering encrypted data would face a challenging technical and
ethical dilemma.
Technology-based solutions will change over time, and will solve
only current issues, but they will remain part of best practices to address
some security issues. Informed attorneys need to be vigilant about
learning about new risks and finding security measures that work with
new technologies.
V. CONCLUSION
Before jotting off a quick email, attorneys need to consider the risks
of email technology with their clients. Privacy expectations in email
now depend on case-specific variables. Attorneys must be aware that
these expectations may vary depending on local data privacy laws,
privacy policies, and the devices used to access information. Model
rules now require attorneys to be aware of the risks of the technology
they are using and to educate themselves about technology. Using email
for confidential or privileged communication requires an attorney’s
judgment, along with the client’s informed consent.
Attorneys need to discuss email’s risks with clients to mutually create
a solution for that client’s needs. Obviously, security needs will vary,
but even the most benign content, such a scheduling email sent to an
employee’s email, may be devastating to a client. Before an attorney
can make such a judgment call, he needs to understand the risks
involved and discuss them with his client. Clients must work with their
attorneys to decide what precautions are appropriate, as it will be the
client filing the grievance.
Attorney and client levels of sophistication may vary; some clients
may demand security measures or have their own policies for securing
data.333 Some law firms have the best security measures in the world
and the personnel and training to enforce it. Unsophisticated clients and
smaller practices may be less equipped to handle evolving technology.
Attorneys need to educate themselves about the risks in email and
consider their security policies and whether they know if their policies
truly safeguard client’s confidential information.334 Attorneys should
333. Martha Neil, Corporate Clients Should Ask Specific Questions About Law Firm Security,
Experts Say, ABA J. Feb. 21, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/corporate_clients_must_ponder/.
334. Poje, supra note 259, at 5.
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consider policies about encryption and also about acceptable email use.
When using third-party email services, attorneys should consider
privacy policies and what types of data are appropriate to send to those
systems.
Most importantly, attorneys must be able to educate their clients
about the risks of technology they choose to use, including the risks of
using third-party services to do so. When an attorney or his firm is
unable to understand the risks, or if the burden of this education is too
severe, email may not be the proper medium to communicate with
clients. Technology-based ethics opinions can never be the solution for
long, and it is dangerous to rely on their assurances. In a world with a
battery of data privacy laws, evolving ethical guidance, and lengthy
privacy policies, an attorney may wish to err on the side of caution,
instead of risking his professional license on technology he does not
understand.
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